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Abstract
The ability of countries to preserve the current fiscal policy
without running into solvency problems and possible default
has become a great concern for many industrialized coun-
tries, which experienced significant increases in their national
debt levels during the aftermath of the economic and finan-
cial crisis. Sustainable public finances and lower public debt
burdens are important elements to ensure that countries are
strong enough to cope with adverse macroeconomic contexts
and projected implicit liabilities related to aging, i.e. pension,
health care, and long-term care expenditures.
The aim of this thesis is to provide different perspectives on
the study of pension systems and fiscal sustainability. In
the first chapter, we estimate the impact of immigration on
the sustainability of Italian public finances using the metho-
dology of Generational Accounting, showing that the burden
of current fiscal policy reduces as integration of the foreign-
born increases. In the second chapter, we investigate how un-
certainty regarding future mortality and life expectancy out-
comes have affected the Italian public pension budget, reveal-
ing a consistent underestimation of actual life spans when
forecasts are based on expectations. Finally, in the third chap-
ter, we analyze in a general equilibrium framework labor mar-
ket distortions and capital accumulation arising within dif-
ferent pension systems to highlight the importance of guar-
anteeing both financial viability and retirement income ade-
quacy.
xiv
Chapter 1
Introduction
The ability of countries to preserve the current fiscal policy without run-
ning into solvency problems and possible default1 has become a great
concern for many industrialized countries who experienced significant
increases in their national debt levels in the aftermath of the economic
and financial crisis. Actually, government gross financial liabilities have
increased, on average, from 55% of GDP in 2007 to 88% in 2014 across
OECD countries (OECD (2015)).
Sustainable public finances and lower public debt burdens are im-
portant elements to ensure that countries are strong enough to cope with
adverse macroeconomic contexts, such as the current low inflation and
moderate GDP growth registered in most of industrialized countries.
Moreover, in a longer-term perspective, solid public finances may help
governments to deal with projected implicit liabilities related to aging,
i.e. pension, health care, and long-term care expenditures. Actually,
as shown by the long-term budgetary projections of EC (2016), aging
population will translate in a significant fiscal burden threatening the
financial viability of most of industrialized countries already during the
next decade.2 Furthermore, OECD (2015) estimates show that due to
1For a broader discussion on the concept of fiscal sustainability see EC (2016).
2Focusing on EU reality, EC (2016) shows that between 2013 and 2060 the projected
change in public age-related expenditure (pensions, health care, long-term care and edu-
cation) will be around 1.3 pp of GDP.
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population aging, on average across OECD countries public pension ex-
penditure is projected to grow from 9.5% of GDP in 2015 to 11.7% in
2050.
The aging process faced by many OECD countries is driven by de-
clines in fertility rates and increases in life expectancy. In most indus-
trialized countries fertility rates experienced a sharp decline by the late
1960s, falling below the replacement level around 1980, implying shrink-
ing generations (OECD (2014b) and OECD (2015)). Conversely, increases
in life expectancy of individuals, which is the main driving force behind
population aging, are dated to the beginning of the 20th century.3 The
increasing longevity trend has not slowed down recently, if we explore
the recent period data (OECD (2016)) in OECD countries life expectancy
for males aged 65 increased from 15.8 years in 2001 to 17.6 years in
2011. Likewise, for females aged 65, in the same years, life expectancy
increased from 19.4 to 21 years. According to OECD (2015), the number
of elderly people is projected to account for an increasing share of the
total world population passing from 8% in 2015 to almost 18% by 2050,
and from 16% to 27% in OECD countries. Moreover, in the OECD, the
share of the population older than 75 years will be similar in 2050 to the
share older than 65 years today.4
The observed increases in the median age of the population, which
is projected to continue raising over the years ahead, have resulted in an
increase in the old age dependency ratio.5 Actually, according to OECD
3At the beginning of the last century, the major determinants of reductions in mortality
were decreases in infant mortality and reductions in mortality at older ages caused by
measures able to counteract the contraction and the spread of diseases, i.e. improvements
in nutrition and public health care. Around the 1950s, mortality reduction across the age
spectrum was mainly due to the developments of vaccines and antibiotics. Nowadays,
chronic diseases are the major cause of morbidity and mortality (OECD (2014b)).
4Regarding EU and the euro area, by 2060 the proportion of people aged 0-14 is pro-
jected to remain fairly constant around 15%, while those aged 15-64 will reduce from 66%
to 57%. Those aged 65 and over and those aged 80 and over will become a much larger
share: by 2060, the former will rise from 18% to 28% of the population, while the latter
will rise from 5% to 12% of the population (see EC (2015a)).
5The old age dependency ratio is the ratio of older dependents (people older than 64)
to the working-age population (those aged 15-64). In 2015, the demographically oldest
OECD country was Japan, with a old age dependency ratio equal to 47. Germany and Italy
also had high old age dependency ratios equal to 35 and 37 respectively (OECD (2015)).
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(2015), the old age dependency ratio, equal to 14 in 1950, reached the
value of 28 in 2015, and it is projected to nearly double in 2075 reaching
the value of 55.
Therefore, aging population poses a persistent challenge for western
economies facing budgetary implications of demographic changes. Ac-
cording to EC (2016), a country’s fiscal situation can be assessed through
three main types of economic models. In particular, alongside the less
frequently used macroeconomic and dynamic general equilibrium mod-
els (the latter often with overlapping-generations household structure),
the quantitative confirmation of the sustainability of current policy is
usually achieved via the implementation of Generational Accounting tech-
nique. In particular, analyses using this methodology may help in better
understanding the extent to which government fiscal policies mitigate or
exacerbate the economic risks facing different generations.6
In particular, the increasing old age dependency ratio should be seri-
ously taken into account by governments who are financing public pen-
sions via the Pay-as-you-go system (PAYG). In a PAYG system, active pop-
ulation finance pensions of same-period retirees based on the promise
that they will receive a similar treatment by future workers. Due to this
working mechanism, a decline in population growth may jeopardize the
financial viability of the system itself since it reduces the likelihood that
the promise can be maintained in the future.7 Actually, many OECD
countries providing PAYG-financed public pensions will experience fi-
nancial troubles caused by the retirement of the Baby Boom generation,
which is a cohort much larger than the one that followed in the work-
force. Moreover, for PAYG-financed public pensions, population aging
will create sustainability problems to the extent that if increases in life
expectancy exceed forecasts,8 governments will have to pay retirement
benefits even more than expected exacerbating the financial burden for
6See Auerbach et al. (1991) and Auerbach et al. (1994).
7According to Samuelson (1958), Aaron (1966), and Samuelson (1975), the PAYG sys-
tem, defined as the social contract between generations, is desirable only when each gen-
erations maintain positive real rates of return on contributions, which happens so long as
real earnings growth and population growth remain positive.
8The discrepancy between actual and expected life spans and its related uncertainty is
called longevity risk (see for instance IMF (2012)).
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public finances.
In order to boost financial sustainability OECD (2015) and EC (2016)
propose different measures, such as: increases in statutory retirement
age; nominal benefits cut; increases in taxes or social security contribu-
tions on pension income, and minimum contributory periods; reductions
in the valorisation of past and present pension contributions; introduc-
tion of automatic adjustment mechanisms; improvements in administra-
tive efficiency; tighter access to early-retirement and/or increased finan-
cial incentives to work beyond the pensionable age, and higher penalties
to early pension benefit withdrawal. Additionally, some countries (e.g.,
Italy and Sweden) have introduced the so called notional defined contri-
bution (NDC) scheme. By maintaining a PAYG-finance, the NDC plan
provides benefits that bear an actuarial relationship to individual life-
time contributions.9 Nevertheless, due to demographic changes, the in-
troduction of all of these measures can only partially ease PAYG system’s
sustainability tension.
According to EC (2015a), the most credited solution to the sustain-
ability problem originated by PAYG system in an aging economy is the
privatization of social security, i.e. the shift from the PAYG to the fully
funded system (FF) where each individual builds up her own pension by
contributing to a personal account.
However, population aging together with the current economic envi-
ronment characterized by low returns, low growth and low interest rates,
create serious problems not only for PAYG financed public pensions, but
also for funded pensions (OECD (2014b)). In particular, defined bene-
fit funded pensions that pre-commit to pay a defined pension benefit no
matter on the value of assets accumulated, need to secure their continued
solvency. Actually, if pension promises rely on forecasts that underesti-
mate life expectancy of individuals, the present value of pension pay-
ments will also be underestimated and actual pension payments will be
larger than expected. Conversely, defined contribution pensions, where
the post-retirement consumption, given life expectancy and the interest
rate, is determined only by the amount of contributions paid into the
9See for example Disney et al. (1999), World Bank (2005), and Holzmann et al. (2006).
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fund, need to ensure income adequacy during retirement. In this case,
since the future value of pension savings and the present value of pen-
sion benefits are equal by definition, there is no guarantee of whether
this amount is able to ensure retirement income adequacy.
Actually, provided the heavy focus of recent pension policy actions on
improving the financial viability of pension systems, any social welfare
program has to guarantee an adequate standard of living in retirement
(OECD (2015)).
However, the problem that every government has to face is that pol-
icy measures aimed at increasing income adequacy during retirement
might add pressures on the financial sustainability of the pension sys-
tem, operating thus in the opposite direction. For example, increases
in benefits in a system in which there is a weak link between contribu-
tions and benefits, will affect financial balances. By the same reasoning,
when public pensions are at risk of being inadequate, there will be pres-
sure to raise benefits in order to prevent old-age poverty. According to
OECD (2015), over the recent period about half of OECD countries have
taken measures to improve the financial sustainability of their pension
systems while about one third of the countries have improved the ade-
quacy of retirement income for targeted groups. Countries where results
of reforms are expected to be broad are those that took a combination
of measures, such as increasing contributions in defined contribution
schemes, increases in statutory retirement age, and introduce tighter ac-
cess to early-retirement. Therefore, in light of the above discussion, in
order to ensure adequate retirement benefits within a financially sustain-
able pension system it is important to diversify the sources to finance re-
tirement and build a pension system that includes both a PAYG-financed
component, and a funded component. The latter will include occupa-
tional as well as personal funded pension plans, normally run by private
institutions. The diversification between funded and Pay-as-you-go, and
between defined benefit and defined contribution enables risk mitiga-
tion as systems have different strengths and weaknesses, thus achieving
a better risk-return profile of pension income (see OECD (2014b) and
OECD (2015)).
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Beside the introduction, the dissertation consists in three chapters
that represent individual articles. Appendices are given at the end of the
corresponding chapter. Each chapter of this dissertation is related to the
analysis of pension systems and the assessment of fiscal sustainability.
In Chapter 2 we estimate the impact of immigration on the sustain-
ability of the Italian public finances using the methodology of Genera-
tional Accounting. We take into account socio-economic differences be-
tween the main migrants communities resident in Italy and we present
three possible scenarios to reflect the potential economic degree of inte-
gration of foreigners in the Italian territory. Moreover, for each scenario
we propose several options for migrants concerning both the length of
permanence in Italy and the possible collection of retirement benefits.
Our results show that the burden of current fiscal policy reduces as inte-
gration of the foreign-born increases. If migrants children are econom-
ically perfectly integrated, the fiscal gap is reduced from 71.9 to -15.3
percent of GDP.
In Chapter 3 we assess, through an empirical investigation based
on Italian data, how uncertainty regarding future mortality may affect
public pension expenditure. Based on a representative sample of Ital-
ian pensioners from 1985 to 2011, we find a consistent underestimation
of improvements seen in mortality and life expectancy when forecasts
are based on expectations. The pension expenditure estimated using re-
alized mortality rates is shown to be consistently higher than that ob-
tained by using average forecasted scenarios, produced with well-known
stochastic mortality models. The chapter highlights the importance of
considering the uncertainty regarding future pension benefits, i.e. of
evaluating and managing the longevity risk in public pension plans.
In Chapter 4 we analyze in a general equilibrium framework both
labor market distortions and capital accumulation arising within three
social security systems: a Pay-as-you-go notional defined contribution
(PAYG NDC), a fully funded (FF), and a newly proposed modified ver-
sion of the FF (MFF) that includes an intragenerational redistributive
component able to guarantee minimum living standards to low-income
retirees. While PAYG NDC depresses labor supply and physical capital
6
accumulation, the FF is neutral on both dimensions. Conversely, the MFF
is able to slightly increase physical capital accumulation (without signif-
icantly reducing labour supply incentives), and to reduce the burden of
future intergenerational redistribution.
7

Chapter 2
Migration in Italy and its
effect on fiscal
sustainability and pensions
2.1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the Lehmann and Euro crisis, official sovereign debt
levels have stood in the focus of the political and public discussions. In
contrast, starting from the 1900s academia and think tanks have pointed
out that the ability of countries to preserve their current fiscal policy
without running into solvency problems and possible default should be
(given the drastic ageing of many societies) the far bigger concern. The
social safety net established in many countries (and therefore especially
pensions, health and long-term care systems) will be under enormous
fiscal pressure.
To analyze such intertemporal challenges of public coffers, classic
budgetary indicators have only small informational value. However, a
quantitative confirmation of the sustainability of current fiscal policy
can be achieved via the implementation of Generational Accounting. This
methodology is used to assess whether government fiscal policies mit-
igate or exacerbate the economic risks facing different generations (see
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Auerbach et al. (1991), Auerbach et al. (1992), Auerbach et al. (1994),
Kotlikoff and Raffelhu¨schen (1999), Raffelhu¨schen (1999), Hagist et al.
(2009), and Bonin (2013).1
Notably, many authors used the Generational Accounting technique
to argue that immigration could alleviate fiscal pressure associated with
an aging population (for instance see Auerbach and Oreopoulos (2000),
Bonin et al. (2000), Bonin (2013), and Rowthorn (2008)). Actually, immi-
gration can contribute to a favorable readjustment in the age structure of
the population and, by altering the size and the composition of the labor
force in the receiving country, generates tax revenues to finance pensions
and welfare services for the elderly (among others, see Borjas (1994),
Bonin et al. (2000), and Bonin (2013)). More generally, the fiscal impact
of immigration depends on the nature of the tax and benefit system in
the host country (i.e. taxes paid by foreigners and welfare benefits and
government services they receive), as well as on demographic and eco-
nomic characteristics of the immigrants (e.g., skills, ability to find a work
without displacing local workers).
In this chapter, we estimate the impact of immigration on the sustain-
ability of the Italian welfare state using the methodology of Generational
Accounting. In the past, Franco et al. (1992), Cardarelli and Sartor (2000),
Coda Moscarola (2001), and Rizza and Tommasino (2010) applied this
accounting methodology to Italy although only Coda Moscarola (2001)
considered immigration.
We provide new evidences with respect to past research and the nov-
elties can be summarized as follows. We distinguish migrants resident
in Italy by their origin country in order to highlight the socio-economic
differences between the major communities, namely the Albanian, the
Chinese, the Moroccans, the Non-EU citizens, the Romanian and the
Ukrainian. Moreover, we include three possible scenarios that reflect
the potential degree of integration of migrants in Italy. Additionally, we
propose several options concerning both the length of permanence on
the Italian territory, and the possible collection of retirement benefits to
1Alongside Generational Accounting, it is worthwhile to mention the fiscal sustainability
technique developed by Blanchard et al. (1991).
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take care of the well-known phenomenon of return migration, and to
take into account potential difficulties in the collection of Italian pen-
sions after emigration.
In our analysis we find that firstly Italy is in a comparable good po-
sition from an intertemporal perspective as the fiscal gap in the standard
scenario is only slightly positive meaning that the external debt is re-
duced significantly through implicit assets for which mainly the pension
reform is responsible. Secondly, we find that integration is a major key
for Italy to fortify its sustainable position as complete integration of the
second generation of migrants reduces the fiscal gap again significantly.
Thirdly, we find that the current regime of extreme bureaucratic hurdles
for claiming pension benefits for migrants leaving Italy is giving a signif-
icant gain for Italys public coffers. As Italy is per se in a good position,
this regime should be reformed to a fairer scheme.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides a general over-
view of the immigration phenomenon in Italy focusing on the migrants
rights to access the Italian social security. Section 2.3 describes the me-
thodology of Generational Accounting and the calculation of the sustain-
ability indicators used. Section 2.4 describes the data used in the anal-
ysis, which are general government budget of a certain base-year, age-
and sex-specific profiles, budgetary and population projections, and as-
sumptions on growth and discount rates. Finally, Section 2.5 presents
the results of the Generational Accounting using different sustainability
indicators, and Section 2.6 provides some policy recommendations and
concludes.
2.2 Immigration in Italy: Facts and Norms
2.2.1 Italy as a country of arrival of international migra-
tion
In the last decades, Italy has become one of the main countries of im-
migration in Europe. At the beginning of the 1990s, the foreign popula-
tion resident in Italy amounted only to 500,000 people (ISTAT (1998)). A
11
decade later, in 2001, the 14th Census (ISTAT (2001)) registered 1.334.889
foreign individuals. That number increased by 2.5 million people in the
following ten years reaching the value of 4,029,145 individuals in 2011
as reported by the 15th Census (ISTAT (2011)). At the end of 2014, there
were 5,014,000, foreigners residents in Italy (IDOS (2015)). According to
IDOS (2015) by including Non-EU residents awaiting registration in the
Italian registry offices, the total foreign presence in Italy was 5,421,000
people.
These numbers reveal that the incidence of the foreign population on
the total population resident in Italy, which jumped from 2.3% in 2001
to 8.1% in 2014, is currently higher than the European average MPLS
(2014e)).2
According to IDOS (2015) at the end of 2014, the majority of for-
eigners resident in Italy (more than 2.6 million) were European citizens.
Slightly less than 30% of them come from an EU member state (1.5 mil-
lion). An additional 20.5% (1 million people) come from Africa, and the
19.3% (969,000 individuals) come from Asia. Foreigners from the Amer-
icas were less than 7.7% (400,000 individuals), while those from Oceania
together with stateless individuals were only 3000.
Top ten nationalities’ share of population increased during the years
even though a very high heterogeneity of origin is registered: it takes the
top five citizenships to reach the 50%, and the first 16 to capture the 75%
of the total number of foreign residents. In particular, the largest foreign
community in Italy is the Romanian one (1,131,839 people), followed
by the Albanian (490,483 people), the Moroccan (449,058 people), the
Chinese (265,820 people) and the Ukrainian (226,060 people).
Foreign population growth among the years slowed the aging process
of the domestic resident population. Indeed, while on average foreigners
have an age of around 32 years, the Italians are 12 years older with an
age of almost 45 years. In particular, in 2014, the 13.9% of the Italian
population lies in the age range 0-14. The 21.3% belongs to the age class
15-35 while the 43.4% has an age between 35-64 years. Seniors, i.e. those
2In 2014, the incidence of the foreign population on the total population resident in
European Union was 4.1%.
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aged 65 and over account for the 21.4% of total Italians resident in the
territory. Conversely, the majority of foreigners resident in Italy lies in
the age group 15-39 years. In particular, the 19.2% are below 15 years
old, the 34.3% lies in the age range 15-34, and the 43.8% belongs to the
age group 35-64. Only the 2.7% of the foreigners resident in Italy is older
than 65 (MPLS (2014e)).
According to ISTAT (2015), in the last ten years the foreign labor
supply increased by more than one million individuals. In particular,
the number of foreigners employed in the Italian labor market were
1.158.000 in 2005 rising to 2.294.000 in 2014. Nowadays, foreigners em-
ployed accounts for the 10.3% of the total employed population (IDOS
(2015)). According to OECD and EU (2015) and IDOS (2015), Italy at-
tracts a large number of labor migrants who came to fill low-skilled jobs
not sought after by Italians. According to Fondazione Leone Moressa
(2014), MPLS (2014e), and IDOS (2015), more than one third of foreign
workers are employed in non-skilled occupations while only seven for-
eigners out of 100 have a skilled profession. These percentages do not
change much with the length of permanence in Italy or with the length
of service.3 Moreover, foreign workers are mainly employed in jobs pro-
viding services to individuals, unskilled jobs in the industry, construc-
tion and hotel sectors. Over-qualification is a great concern. According
to IDOS (2015), in 2014 there were 940.000 over-educated foreign work-
ers, which amounted to the 41% of the total foreign occupation, a double
share compared to that of Italians. As a result of their low-skilled occu-
pations, in 2014 the net monthly pay of foreign workers was 28.5% on
average lower than the one of Italians (958 Euros compared to 1,340 Eu-
ros).
Finally, it is worth mentioning that immigrant workers benefit less
from welfare policies for two main reasons. First because Italy’s to-
3According to CNEL and MPLS (2012) in 2011, there was a reduction in the employ-
ment of high skilled workers present for more than 10 years in Italy, and a reduction in the
employment of those with higher education. In 2007, it was exactly the opposite. There-
fore, it seems that those who stay in Italy for longer periods are the low skilled workers.
On the contrary, the migration process of the high skilled workers tends to be a temporary
or short-term one.
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tal expenditure on social security (with the exception of contributory
pensions) is less than the average expenditure of all the other EU Mem-
ber States, and second because the foreign population, being on average
younger than the Italian one, has a little influence of the public pen-
sion and long-term-care expenditures (EMN (2014) and IDOS (2015)).
In particular, based on 2014 data, IDOS (2015) estimated that in 2013
foreigners working in Italy paid taxes for 6.1 billion Euros and social se-
curity contributions for 10.5 billion Euros, determining a total revenue
for the Italian State of 16.6 billion Euros. Nevertheless, the total expen-
diture of the state for them was only 13.5 billion, which determined a
positive balance of 3.1 billion. Moreover, in 2013 the GDP contribution
produced by immigrants was equal to 123,072 billion Euros accounting
for the 8.8% of Italian GDP.
2.2.2 The most relevant foreign communities in Italy
As already introduced, the main protagonists of the migratory phenome-
non in Italy are the Romanian, the Albanian, the Moroccan, the Chinese,
and the Ukrainian communities.
Regarding the socio-demographic characteristics of these communi-
ties (see MPLS (2014a), MPLS (2014b), MPLS (2014c), MPLS (2014d),
and MPLS (2014e)) the Romanian, the Albanian, the Moroccan and the
Chinese communities have a rather balanced gender structure of the
population. Notwithstanding, the female share of Romanians is slightly
bigger than the male share of the population, and the Albanian and Mo-
roccan are slightly male dominated communities, but with a growing
female share during the years as a result of family reunifications and
births on the Italian soil. Conversely, Ukrainian community in Italy has
an 80% female presence compared to a 20% male presence, highlighting
a strong gender polarization. Concerning the age structure of different
communities, within the Romanian, Albanian, Moroccan, and Chinese
communities the young age bracket prevails with a high incidence of
minors characterizing the former three communities (for Albanians and
Moroccans it reach one quarter of the total). On the contrary, within the
Ukrainian community the old age brackets prevail. Most of the Alba-
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nian and Moroccan presence in the Italian territory is connected to fam-
ily reason while the Chinese, who are characterized by a family migra-
tory model, apply more for residence permits connected to job reasons.
Finally, the Ukrainian community with its high female share of around
50 years old tends to apply for residence permits connected to job rea-
sons. Linked to the increase in family reunifications, during the years
Italy experienced a remarkable increase of new-born immigrants in the
territory.4
Finally, as regard the mean of permanence in the Italian territory,
from ISTAT (2015) we estimate that the average length of stay is around
9.7 years for Romanians, 12.2 years for Albanians, 12 years for Moroc-
cans and Chinese, and 10.5 years for Ukrainians.
By looking at the Italian labor market (see Fondazione Leone Moressa
(2014), MPLS (2014a), MPLS (2014b), MPLS (2014c), MPLS (2014d),
MPLS (2014e), and IDOS (2015)) we find that these communities are
prevalently employed in non-skilled occupations. In particular, Roma-
nian women tend to work as personal careers or domestic employees,
in the hotel sector as bartender, waiter and cleaners, contrarily Roma-
nian men are mainly employed in the construction sector as stonema-
sons and bricklayers. Albanians are mainly employed in the construc-
tion industry as stonemasons and in agriculture as mixed crop laborers.
Moroccan men are mainly employed in the trade sector as street ven-
dors and operators of retail sales, in construction as stonemasons, and
agriculture as mixed crop laborers. The Chinese have a high proportion
of self-employed workers and work especially in the trade sector, in the
textile industry and the hotel sector. Ukrainian women are mainly em-
ployed as personal careers or domestic workers. Workers belonging to
the Albanian and Moroccan communities receive a monthly wage that is
on average just above 1000 Euros. Conversely, as a result of the specific
working sector, all foreign women receive a monthly income far below
their respective male part of the population (see INPS (2014)). Relevant
features of each community are summarized in Table 1.
4According to Italian Law, individuals born in Italy to foreign parents are not Italian
citizens by birth (ius soli does not apply).
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Table 1: The most relevant foreign communities in Italy
Residents
at
1/1/2014
Female
(in %)
Minors
(in %)
Mean of
perma-
nence
(in years)
Main sector
of employ-
ment M(F)
Average
annual
income
(in Euro)
RO 1,131,839 56.8 26.4 9.7 Construction
(Domestic
care, Hotel)
11,541
(7,506)
AL 490,483 48 27.5 12.2 Industry,
Construc-
tion, Agri-
culture
(Domestic
care, Hotel)
14,920
(8,815)
MA 449,058 44 30.3 12 Trade, Con-
struction,
Agriculture
(Domestic
care)
13,700
(8,149)
CN 265,820 49 26 12 Self-
employed
in Trade,
Textile in-
dustry, Hotel
(same as M)
7,593
(6,619)
UA 226,060 79.9 8.8 10.5 Industry
(Domestic
care)
11,591
(8,070)
Source: INPS (2014), MPLS (2014a)-MPLS (2014e), ISTAT (2015), Strozza (2015).
Overall, in our Generational Accounting analysis we focus on Romani-
ans, Albanians and Moroccans since they are very radical communities in
the Italian territory with stabilization phenomena identifiable through
the relevant increase of the share of long term residents (for the latter
two), and family reunifications, as well as the considerable incidence of
second generations. Moreover, we include the Chinese community since
it is consolidating its presence in Italy especially with their propensity
toward the development of autonomous enterprises and a family migra-
tion model. Finally, even though the Ukrainian community has a recent
migratory history (low incidence of residence permits for long-term res-
idents, strong gender imbalance, and scarce incidence of minors), we
include it in the analysis because it is an old community implying that
Ukrainians are very likely to meet the age requirement for pension eligi-
bility.
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2.2.3 Migrants’ access to the Italian Social Security Sys-
tem
During the 1970s and 1980s, Italy experienced a series of pension re-
forms that, together with the aging population and the slowdown in
growth5, boosted the pension expenditure at an unsustainable level (see
Fornero and Castellino (2001)). In order to provide corrections to the
Italian social security system and stabilize the long-run ratio of pensions’
expenditure to GDP, Italy has gone through several pension reforms over
the last decades, amongst others, the gradual shift to the Notional de-
fined contribution (NDC) scheme,6 the revision of the NDC transforma-
tion coefficients (which account for the increase of life expectancy), the
introduction of an automatic link between life expectancy and pension-
able age, the reduction in benefits for future retirees, and the increase in
the age at which people can first claim pensions. These measures helped
to contain the explosion of the pension spending in the long run. Actu-
ally, according to OECD (2015), the Italian public spending on pensions
is forecasted to slightly reduce until 2060.
With the entry into force of the last pension reform, the Fornero re-
form (Law 213 of December 22nd 2011), all contributions paid after Jan-
uary 1st 2012 are calculated according to the NDC system. Moreover,
getting access to the old age pension requires an age of 66 years7 in addi-
tion to a contribution requirement of at least 20 years. Conversely, being
entitled to the early retirement benefit now demand a contribution re-
5Aging population implies a lengthening in pensions’ payment period, while the slow-
down in growth implies a reduction in the amount of contributions used to finance retirees’
pensions.
6NDC pensions were introduced in Italy after 1/1/1996. In particular, workers with
more than 18 years of contribution at 12/31/1995 would have received a defined benefit
(DB) pension; conversely, individuals hired after 1/1/1996 would have obtained the NDC
pension. Moreover, workers with less than 18 years of contribution at 12/31/1995 would
have obtained a mixed pension, i.e. a benefit computed according to both schemes DB and
NDC.
7Starting from January 1st 2012, the age requirement for the old age pension was set
at 66 years for all male employees and self-employed and for women working in the pub-
lic sector. In 2012, employed women in the private sector could retire at 62 while self-
employed women were allowed to retire at 63 years and six months. The age requirement
is raised up to 66 years starting from 2018, and will continue to raise in line with life
expectancy.
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quirement of 41 years and ten months for women and 42 years and ten
months for men. Such requirement gradually raise in line with life ex-
pectancy.8
As regards the social security provisions for immigrant workers liv-
ing in Italy, the Italian Law establishes that they are the same that apply
to Italian workers. However, in the case of repatriation,9 the equality
of treatment between Italians and migrants is guaranteed only when the
foreign born accrue autonomously the right to receive a pension, or when
they become eligible for retirement by means of the aggregation of social
security contributions paid in Italy and in the origin country.10
Indeed, aiming to strengthen the cooperation between national so-
cial security authorities, Italy adopted the Regulation no. 883/2004 and
signed several bilateral agreements with third country nationals admit-
ting the aggregation of social insurance periods spent in contracting States
to reach the pension eligibility requirements established by national laws.
Under this system, the amount of the pension is determined by each
country according to its own system of calculation and in proportion to
the insurance periods completed under the national legislation (the pro-
rata system). The Regulation no. 883/2004 applies to all EU Country
members11 and to Switzerland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland, and
is directly applicable by contracting member states. Conversely, bilateral
8As regards the age requirement, the reform provided a reduction in the pension en-
titlements for those workers who choose to collect their early pension before the age of
62.
9In the case of repatriation, the requisites to have access to old-age pensions differ with
respect to the contributory and non-contributory schemes (Circolare INPS March 14, 2011
n.35). If migrants are entitled to NDC, they can collect their pension when they reach the
age requirement provided by law (they do not have to meet the contribution requirement).
Conversely, they can receive the DB or Mixed pension only if they satisfy both age and
contribution requirements.
10Individuals can aggregate contributions of the following types: mandatory, imputed
(military service, sickness, maternity, ordinary redundancy fund, unemployment, tuber-
culosis, mobility), voluntary, and others (redemption of the period of university education,
omitted contributions and contributions for an activity carried out in foreign countries
with no agreement in force).
11Countries considered are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Denmark, Es-
tonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Leetonia, Lithuania, Luxemburg,
Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Romania, Slo-
vakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Hungary.
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agreements with third country nationals must be ratified by the Italian
parliament in order to entry into force. So far, Italy has signed and rat-
ified bilateral agreements with: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Cape Verde,
Israel, Jersey, Principality of Monaco, Republic of San Marino, United
States, Tunisia, Uruguay, Vatican Holy See, Venezuela and the Republics
of the former Yugoslavia, namely Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Ser-
bia, Montenegro, Kosovo.
Obviously, a “basic protection” of the rights of third country nation-
als applies even if no bilateral agreement on social security is in force. In
that case, workers who return to their home country maintain the social
security rights already accrued, but they will only be able to enjoy them
after reaching the eligibility requirements provided by the Italian law.
Moreover, if the contribution requisite is not satisfied, foreign citizens
who meet the age requirement may apply for the quota of their pension,
which correspond to their reduced contributions (see EMN (2014) and
INPS (2015)).
Regarding the major communities in Italy, Romanians have less strin-
gent rules for exportability of social security benefits than Albanians,
Moroccans, Chinese and Ukrainians. Actually, Romanians eligible for
retirement may demand the payment of benefits abroad. The only ex-
ception regards the payment abroad of non-contributory pensions. So-
cial allowances (pensione sociale and assegno sociale) which are based on
age and income rather than contributions paid, and other welfare ben-
efits (such as pensions and allowances in favor of the blind, deaf and
disabled people) cannot be exported. Conversely, Albanians, Moroc-
cans, Chinese and Ukrainians are not covered by a bilateral agreement
on pensions and for this reason they have a less favorable treatment than
Romanians. For them pensions, with the exception of welfare benefits
(i.e. non-contributory benefits) and accident insurance benefits are ex-
portable abroad, while benefits related to illness, maternity, unemploy-
ment and ordinary redundancy are not.
As highlighted by EMN (2014), foreign workers, who usually have a
fragmented career and are often forced to return home prematurely, due
to loss of their jobs or the non-renewal of their residence permit, may
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be not aware of the possibility of applying for a pro-rata while living
abroad, and, even those who do know about this possibility, may not
know how to apply for it. Actually, according to INPS (2015), at the
end of 2014, the 21% of foreign born workers aged 66 and over did not
receive any retirement benefit for the contributions paid to the Italian
social security (they were 198.430 out of 927.448 individuals).
As argued by Holzmann et al. (2005) when the portability of social
security contributions is not properly guaranteed, the enrollment in the
informal sector becomes more attractive for migrants. Indeed, migrants
who wishes to return to their home country after a period spent working
abroad and who are not sure of being able to keep their benefits face high
incentives to avoid paying social security contributions during the stay in
the host country. Consequently, migrant workers will seek to participate
in the informal sector of the host country instead of the formal sector.
Enhancing portability of long-term social security benefits may therefore
be a useful tool for migrant-receiving countries to encourage migrants to
participate in the formal sector and discourage irregular migration.
2.3 The Methodology of Generational Account-
ing
To measure the sustainability of a country’s public sector we use the
method of Generational Accounting developed by Auerbach et al. (1991),
Auerbach et al. (1992), and Auerbach et al. (1994). In contrast to tradi-
tional budget indicators which are based on annual cash flow budgets,
Generational Accounting is founded on the intertemporal budget con-
straint and therefore the long-term implications of a current policy can
be computed.12 The intertemporal budget constraint of the public sec-
tor, expressed in present value terms of a base-year b is:
12 The further description of the methodology of Generational Accounting is mainly based
on Raffelhu¨schen (1999), Hagist et al. (2011), Bonin (2013). For an analytical derivation of
the intertemporal budget constraint see Benz and Fetzer (2006) or Fetzer (2006). Hagist
(2008) gives an overview about the empirical studies with Generational Accounting along
with a discussion concerning critical points in theoretical as well as empirical terms.
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Bb =
b−D∑
k=b
Nb,k +
∞∑
k=b+1
Nb,k (2.1)
D denotes agents’ maximum age andNb,k the present value of year b’s net
tax payments, i.e., taxes paid net of transfers received, made by all mem-
bers of a generation born in year k over the remaining life cycle. Then,
the first right-hand term of Eq. 2.1 represents the aggregate net taxes of
all generations alive in the base-year b. The second term aggregates the
net tax payments made by future generations born in year b + 1 or later.
Together this is equal to the left-hand side of Eq. 2.1, Bb, which stands
for the net debt in year b. That means if the sum of all living generations’
net taxes,
∑b−D
k=b Nb,k , is negative (i.e. if they receive a net transfer) and
the net debt, Bb, positive, the sum of future generations’ net taxes has
to be positive to balance the government’s intertemporal budget i.e. in
a long-term perspective net transfers received by living generations plus
the net debt of the base-year have to be financed by net taxes paid by
future generations.
To calculate generations’ aggregated life cycle net tax payments, the
net payment terms in Eq. 2.1 are decomposed into:
Nb,k =
k+D∑
s=max{b, k}
Ts,kPs,k (1 + r)
b−s (2.2)
In equation 2.2, Ts,k denotes the average net tax paid in year s by a rep-
resentative member of the generation born in year k, whereas Ps,k stands
for the number of members of a generation born in year k who survives
until year s. To compute the remaining lifetime net payments of living
generations, the future demographic structure is specified conducting
long-term population forecasts.
Typically, Generational Accounts disaggregate Eq. 2.2 even further.
To incorporate gender-specific differences in average tax payments and
transfer receipts by age, separate aggregation of the average net taxes
paid by male and female cohort members is required. The products ag-
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gregated in Eq. 2.2 represent the net taxes paid by all members of gen-
eration k in year s. For generations born prior to the base-year the sum-
mation starts from year b, while for future born cohorts, the summation
starts in year k > b. Irrespective of the year of birth, all payments are
discounted back to the base-year b by application of a real interest rate
r.
The age-specific net tax payment in year s of agents born in year k
can be decomposed as:
Ts,k =
∑
i
hs,k,i (2.3)
hs,k,i stands for the average tax or transfer of type i paid or received in
year s by agents born in year k, thus of age s−k. In Eq. 2.3, h > 0 indicates
a tax payment, whereas h < 0 defines a transfer.
Applying the method of Generational Accounting it is conventionally
assumed that initial fiscal policy and economic behavior are constant
over time. Under this condition it is possible to project future average tax
payments and transfer receipts per capita from the base-year age profile
of payments according to:
hs,k,i = hb,b−(s−k),i (1 + g)s−b (2.4)
where g represents the annual rate of productivity growth. Eq. 2.4 as-
signs to each agent of age s-k in year k the tax and transfer payment
observed for agents of the same age in base-year b, uprated for gains in
productivity. The base-year cross section of age-specific tax and transfer
payments per capita is generally determined in two steps. First, the rel-
ative position of age cohorts between themselves in the tax and transfer
system is estimated from micro-data profiles. In a second step the rel-
ative age profiles are re-evaluated proportionally to fit the expenditure
and tax revenues of the base-year.
For living and future generations, division of the aggregate remaining
lifetime net tax payments by the number of cohort members alive in year
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s defines the cohort’s Generational Account in year s:
GAs,k =
Ns,k
Ps,k
(2.5)
Generational Accounts are constructed in a purely forward-looking man-
ner, only the taxes paid and the transfers received in or after the base-
year are considered. As a consequence, Generational Accounts cannot be
compared across living generations because they incorporate effects of
differential lifetime. One may compare, however, the Generational Ac-
counts of base-year and future born agents, who are observed over their
entire life cycle.
To illustrate the fiscal burden of current fiscal policy we use four sus-
tainability indicators:13 The starting point for the first indicators are the
intertemporal public liabilities which can be computed by the assumption
that the intertemporal budget constraint of the public sector in Eq. 2.1
is violated:
IP Lb = Bb −
∞∑
k=b−D
Nb,k (2.6)
The amount of intertemporal public liabilities measures aggregate unfunded
claims on future budgets, assuming that the present policy will hold for
the future. The first of our used sustainability indicator, the fiscal gap
(FGb), can be derived if the intertemporal public liabilities are set in re-
lation to the GDP of the base-year (GDPb). This indicator is akin to the
debt quota well known since the Maastricht treaty but it addresses the
total debt, i.e. the debt which will occur in the future added to the debt
inherited from the past:
FGb =
IP Lb
GDPb
(2.7)
13 For a discussion of measuring fiscal sustainability and the development of sustainabil-
ity indicators, see Raffelhu¨schen (1999) and Benz and Fetzer (2006).
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How the policy adjustment required to redeem intertemporal public li-
abilities will affect generations’ fiscal burdens is uncertain. For illustra-
tive purposes, Generational Accounting typically assigns the entire adjust-
ment to future generations which is equivalent to k > b. All tax payments
made by members of future born cohorts are adjusted proportionally
with the help of a uniform scaling factor θ. The factor θ is set to ensure
balance of the intertemporal public budget defined in Eq. 2.1:
hs,k,i = θhb,b−(s−k),i (1 + g)s−b (2.8)
for and instead of Eq. 2.4. Computing the average age-specific net taxes
paid by representative future born agents, the burden for future gener-
ations can be illustrated as an absolute difference between the Genera-
tional Account of the base-year agent and the Generational Account of the
one year after base-year born agent. This is our second sustainability
indicator, the future generations’ burden:
FGB = GAb,b −GAθb,b+1 (2.9)
The third indicator that illustrates the burden of current fiscal policy is
the revenue gap. In this case the scaling factor θ = θrev reflects the en-
hancement of age-specific revenues in per cent for all generations which
is necessary to close the intertemporal public budget constraint. It can
also be interpreted as the ratio of the intertemporal public liabilities to the
present value of all age-specific revenues of the fiscal system:
θrev =
IP Lb∑∞
s=bRevs
1
(1+r)(s−b)
(2.10)
with Revs referring to the sum of revenues in year s by all living gener-
ations in year s. Analogous to the revenue gap, we compute also the so-
called transfer gap. In this case the scaling factor θ = θtrf reflects the nec-
essary decrement of age-specific public transfers (Trf ) like health bene-
fits in per cent for all generations that is necessary to close the intertem-
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poral public budget constraint. Constructing the revenue and transfer
gap, we implicitly assume that the government is able to enforce an im-
mediate adjustment of all taxes and contributions or transfers respec-
tively.
All used indicators are defined using an infinite time horizon. In the
practical calculation, all relevant variables like population or cohorts tax
payments are projected for 300 years from the base-year on. Afterwards
a geometric series is used to determine the remaining net tax payments.
The choice of 300 periods is nearly completely arbitrary and just reflects
a good approximation point for our analysis.
2.4 Data and Assumptions
2.4.1 Budgetary data
Aggregates for revenues are taken from ISTAT (2014b) and aggregate for
expenditure are taken from EC (2015a) and Eurostat (2016a). They are
based on detailed statistics about tax and social contribution receipts as
well as the government expenditure by function according to the classi-
fication of the functions of government (COFOG), the harmonized clas-
sification on the international level.
As shown in Table 2, revenues include taxes on labor and capital in-
comes, taxes on consumption, property taxes and social insurance con-
tributions. Expenditures refer to government consumption, and thus
to general public services, defense, public order and safety, economic
affairs and environmental protection, housing and cultural activities.
Moreover, health expenditure here is divided into four subcategories,
namely the in- and outpatient sector, pharmaceutical expenses, and mis-
cellaneous expenditure. Education is parted in four main categories,
namely pre-primary and primary education, secondary education, post-
secondary education and higher education. Finally, the social protection
expenditure is mostly related to old age pensions, sickness and invalidity
pensions, survivor pensions, and family and unemployment allowances.
In total, revenues were 781.6 billion Euros while public expenditure al-
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together made 829.1 billion Euros. This results in a deficit of 47.5 billion
Euros. This deficit minus interest payments on the Italian gross financial
liabilities made up the primary surplus with 30.5 billion Euros.
Table 2: Budget of the Italian Government in 2013
Public Expenses (billion Euros) Public Revenues (billion Euros)
Government Consumption 243.5 Personal Income Tax (IRPEF) 176.3
Long-term Care 29.1 Corporate Income Tax (IRES) 38.8
Inpatient Medical Services 49.7 Other direct taxes 26.9
Outpatient Medical Services 36.3 Value Added Tax (VAT) 93.8
Pharmaceutical Services 10 Enterprise Tax (IRAP) 32
Other Health-related Expenses 2.8 Municipal Property Tax (IMU) 19.2
Pre-school and Primary Education 21.8 Excise taxes and similar taxes 57.8
Secondary Education 26.5 Other indirect taxes 36.8
Post-secondary Education 1.1 Employers social contributions 148.4
Higher Education 5.4 Employees social contributions 37.2
Other Education-related Expenses 5.1 Self-employed social contributions 28.8
Old Age Public Pension 204 Unemployed social contributions 0.8
Survivors Public Pension 40.2 Capital Income Tax 4.1
Sickness an Invalidity Public Pension 35.7 Other revenues 80.7
Family allowances 21.7
Unemployment allowances 18.2 Deficit 47.5
Interest Payment 77.9
Primary Surplus 30.5
Source: ISTAT (2014b), EC (2015a), Eurostat (2016a).
2.4.2 Micro profiles
The age- and sex-specific micro profiles are necessary to define the in-
tertemporal budget constraint of the public sector. These profiles are
used to distribute the different aggregates of public revenues and expen-
ditures on the cohorts which live in the base-year and hence to deter-
mine the future public revenues and expenditures. The micro profiles
stem from various sources. Non age-specific revenues and expenditures
like defense are distributed with a flat per capita profile. Public pension
profiles are taken from ISTAT (2014c); we allocate separately old-age
pensions, survivors pensions, disability allowances (invalidity pensions
- pensioni di invalidita`, and pensions for accidents at work and occupa-
tional diseases - pensioni INAIL), and non-contributory pensions trans-
fers (disability pensions - pensioni di invalidita` civile, social pensions –
pensioni e assegni sociali, and war pensions). Health expenditure profiles
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stem from the Survey on the Health Conditions and Access to Health Ser-
vices, which is conducted by ISTAT (2014a); we separately consider phar-
maceutical services, in- and outpatient medical services, and general
medical services. Moreover, the profile for long-term care stems from
the EC (2015a). Education profiles are taken from Eurostat (2016b); we
divide between four main categories, namely pre-primary and primary
education, secondary education, post-secondary education, and higher
education. Most of the other profiles are based on the Household Sur-
vey of Income and Wealth (SHIW), which is conducted by Banca dItalia
(2014). In particular, on the revenue side we allocate taxes to different
age groups by considering the age and sex distribution of the relevant tax
bases taken from SHIW. We allocate social security contributions using
labor income, value added taxes using consumption,14 taxes on financial
income using the age-sex distribution of financial assets, and taxes on
real estate income using the value of the properties owned. Italian micro
profiles are illustrated in Figure 3 in Appendix A.1.
To specifically account for the peculiar characteristics of the foreign
population residents in Italy, we construct micro profiles for the five ma-
jor communities of migrants, namely for Albanians, Chinese, Moroccans,
Non-EU citizens, Romanians and Ukrainians. Migrants’ profiles are pri-
mary based on information contained in MPLS (2014a), MPLS (2014b),
MPLS (2014c), MPLS (2014d), MPLS (2014e), INPS (2014), and Strozza
(2015) and are built by means of a rescaling process of the Italian mi-
cro profiles. A particular attention is devoted to the construction of mi-
grants’ pension profiles where, in the rescaling process, we include the
community-specific mean of permanence in the Italian territory (see Sec-
tion 2.2.2). Health, long-term care, and education expenditure profiles
make an exception since are assumed equal to those of Italians. Original
data used to build micro profiles for migrants are reported in Figure 4 in
Appendix A.1.
14In the SHIW survey, consumption is reported at the household level. Therefore, we
construct the age profile for the VAT by allocating consumption to each member on the
basis of personal income.
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2.4.3 Budgetary and Demographic projections
Budgetary projections related to health, education, and long-term care
expenditures are taken from official forecasts of the EC (2015a). Differ-
ently, budgetary projections related to social security stem from an own
model that incorporates EC (2015a) estimates to take into account the
existence of different pension schemes (defined benefit, mixed, and no-
tional defined contribution plans).
Regarding demographic projections, for both Italians and foreign-
ers we use the data for the base-year and the assumptions for the de-
velopments of fertility, mortality and net migration provided by Euro-
stat (2013). We then calculate an own demographic projection for 300
periods (see Section 2.3) using an application of the cohort-component
method provided by Bonin (2013).
Projections of annual migrants inflows in Italy are taken from Eu-
rostat (2013), and in order to preserve the different characteristics of
the foreign communities under review, we fix their relative share (over
the total foreign population) at the one observed in the base-year (see
MPLS (2014e)). Furthermore, in annual migrants inflow projections, we
grouped the major EU communities, namely Bulgaria, Poland and Ger-
many, and we treat them as Italians. Moreover, in order to make clear
the effect on the Italian social security system, we assume that Italians
and foreigners share the same fertility and mortality rates.15
Finally, we set a growth rate of 1.5% per annum and a (real) discount
rate of 3% per annum to predict the future revenues and expenditures of
the public sector and to analyze the sustainability of this system. These
assumptions are taken from EC (2015b) as the long-term equilibrium
rates (which every economy reaches until 2060 the latest).
15We address to future research whether and how differences in fertility and mortality
rates between Italians and foreigners affect our calculations.
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2.5 The role of immigration in the sustainabil-
ity of Italy’s fiscal system
In our sustainability analysis, we include three possible scenarios that
reflect the potential degree of integration of migrants in Italy. In the
first scenario, we treat all migrants and newcomer migrants as foreign-
ers. In the second scenario, we make a step forward in the integration
process of migrants: we treat Romanian children younger than 11 in the
base-year as natives, while, due to socio-economic differences with Ital-
ians, we continue to treat the rest of Romanian population, newcomer
Romanians, and all other migrants as foreigners.16 Finally, in the third
scenario we assume a higher level of integration. In particular, we treat
all migrants children younger than 11 in the base-year as Italians, and,
due to socio-economic differences with natives, we consider the rest of
migrants and the newcomer migrants as foreigners.
For each of the aforementioned scenarios we propose several options
concerning both the collection of retirement benefits (see Section 2.2.3
for discussion) and the length of permanence on the Italian territory (the
phenomenon where individuals decide autonomously to return to their
country of origin after a period of work in the receiving country is a high
relevant feature in practice17). In particular, we propose two extreme
options: in the first one all foreigners spend their whole life in Italy and
collect the pension, while in the second one all migrants leave Italy at
the age of 65 without claiming any retirement benefit.18 Moreover, we
introduce seven intermediate options where all foreigners leave Italy af-
ter turning 65, but only selected communities obtain the pension ben-
efit. In particular, for these intermediate options, we first suppose that
16In the second scenario, we decide to treat only Romanians children as Italians. By be-
longing to UE, Romanians have freedom of movements, and unlike all the other considered
communities, they do not need a residence permit for staying in the Italian territory.
17See for instance Borjas and Bratsberg (1994), Dustmann (1996), and Dustmann (2003).
18The assumption of return migration at age 65 is reasonable and not relevant in de-
termining how much migrants contribute to the Italian social security. Actually, in the
construction of migrants’ pension profiles we include the community-specific mean of per-
manence in the Italian territory that we use as a proxy for the length of contribution to the
Italian social security system.
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all foreigners claim the pension, and then we assume that only Romani-
ans collect. Afterwards, we assume that only Romanians and one other
community among the Albanian, the Chinese, the Moroccan, the Non-
EU citizens, and the Ukrainian obtain the pension. Figure 1 summarizes
the proposed scenarios and options.
Figure 1: Scenarios and options
Source: Own hypotheses
2.5.1 Generational Accounts
Using the age- and sex-specific micro profiles, and the budgetary and
population projections, we calculate Generational Accounts of currently
living cohorts under the assumption that current policies remain un-
changed. In particular, Figure 2 presents the Generational Accounts of
the total population resident in Italy (i.e. Italians plus migrants) when,
under different scenarios, everybody collects their pension and spends
their retirement period in Italy.
The sinus-shaped pattern is very common in OECD countries with
strong Pay-as-you-go systems. Irrespective on the scenario, current new-
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Figure 2: Generational Accounts of Italy 2013: Everybody stays and collects
the pension in different scenarios
Source: Own calculation
born and individuals aged between 1 and 53 years are net payers to the
government while generations from 54 years and over are net receivers.19
As expected, strong differences among proposed scenarios exist only
for children aged 0 to 10 years, i.e. those born between 2003 and 2013.
With the low integration assumed in the first scenario, current new-
born are expected to pay to the government net taxes for 16,400 Euros.
Moving integration forward, the same individuals have to pay higher net
taxes equal to 16,530 Euros in the second scenario and to 18,139 Euros
in the third.20 Generational Accounts are at a maximum of 221,500 Eu-
19Compared to other analyses from other countries, the Italian newborn is a net-payer
(see for example Hagist (2008) who shows that in Austria, France, Germany, Switzerland,
the UK and the US, newborns are always net-receivers. This is entirely due to the pension-
reform in Italy as if we assume that the old-pension system would be in place, Italian
newborns also become net receivers (negative generational accounts).
20The increasing pattern in net taxes paid when passing from the first to the third sce-
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ros in scenarios I and II, and of 221,510 Euros in scenario III, paid by
a 27 years old individual. This means that a 27 years old person pays
221,500 Euros more in taxes and contributions over his/her remaining
life-cycle than he/she will receive in transfers and subsidies from the
Italian general government. The generation of 54 years is the first one
which receives more than he/she pays in taxes over his/her remaining
life cycle. However, one should keep in mind that Generational Account-
ing is strict forward looking so living generations’ accounts are not com-
parable. Finally, we observe that the major receiver is the generation of
67 years olds: 347,910 Euros in the first scenario, and 347,900 Euros in
the second and third scenario.
2.5.2 The Fiscal gap and other sustainability indicators
Our first sustainability indicator is the fiscal gap as defined in Eq. 2.7.
It measures the sum of the Generational Accounts for living and future
generations, weighted with their (expected) cohort size, set in relation
to base-year’s GDP. By looking at Table 3, in the reasonable hypothesis
where all foreigners decide to migrate back in their origin country, but
only Romanians collect the pension from abroad, the fiscal gap for the
whole Italian public sector is -80.5% in the first scenario, -81.7% in the
second, and -89.9% in the third.21 This means that the observed mi-
grants’ tendency of leaving Italy without claiming the retirement benefit
translates in a huge gain for Italy in terms of higher fiscal sustainability.
Notably, the fiscal gap reduces as we move integration forward, i.e. if we
go from the first to the third scenario.
Our second indicator is the future generations’ burden. To calculate
this indicator, the intertemporal public liabilities and the number of peo-
ple in future generations are set in proportion to each other (Eq. 2.9).
This indicator implies that the entire adjustment is borne by future gen-
erations. The burden for future generations can be illustrated as an ab-
nario is particularly relevant for all the cohorts born between 2003 and 2013. Migrant
children pay more in net taxes when are treated as Italians than as migrants.
21The fiscal gap is positive if a government is in debt i.e. if the demographic development
puts a burden on public coffers. Hence, a negative algebraic sign imputes a net wealth over
the long-term of the country’s fiscal policy.
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solute difference between the generational account of the base-year and
the generational account of the one year after base-year born agent. In
the same hypothesis where migrants return to their home countries, but
where only Romanians collect the benefit from abroad, the public sector
assigns a future generations’ burden of -33.8 base-year GDP in the first
scenario, -33.7 in the second, and -35.0 in the third. One has to keep in
mind that changing the assumptions from scenario I to scenario II (and
then III subsequently) alters the socio-demographic structure of the pop-
ulation. This is why comparing the above example, the fiscal gap shows
an improvement (from -80.5 (scenario I, everybody leaves, RO collect)
to -81.7) which is also reflected in the revenue and transfer gap (from -
2.800 (3.165) percent in scenario I to -2.801 (3.173)). Therefore, at a first
glance it may be counterintuitive that the indicator future generations’
burden is decreasing from a (positive) value of 33,800 Euro (scenario I)
to 33,700 Euro (scenario II). However, economically this just reflects that
the “gain” in the fiscal gap from changing the socio-economic structure
of children with a migration background is stemming more from higher
net taxes paid by future generations than by living ones. To put it in
other words, the share of the present value of the sum of higher net taxes
(i.e. a better fiscal gap) of future generations is higher than that of the
living ones in scenario II and III. Therefore, the future generations burden
(or in this case better future generations’ benefit) is higher (respectively
the benefit is reduced) between the two scenarios with a higher degree of
integration (from scenario I to III).
The future born agent has to carry a lower burden compared to the
corresponding living generation. This is also reflected in our last two
sustainability indicators, the revenue and transfer gap. In the same situ-
ation where all foreigners decide to return to their origin country, but
where only Romanians collect the pension from abroad, Italys govern-
ment would have to cut all taxes by 2.8% in scenario I and II, and by
2.9% in scenario III. Alternatively, Italys government could increase all
transfers by 3.2% in the first two scenarios, and by 3.3% in the third.
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Table 3: Sustainability Indicators
Fiscal gap
(% GDP
2013)
Future gen-
eration’s
burden (%
GDP 2013)
Revenue
gap (%)
Transfer
gap (%)
I Scenario
E stays and collects 71.9 17.1 2.5 -2.6
E leaves, nobody collects22 -98.5 -51.9 -3.4 3.9
E leaves and collects -18.2 -12.0 -0.6 0.7
E leaves, RO collect -80.5 -33.8 -2.8 3.2
E leaves, RO & AL collect -73.2 -31.3 -2.5 2.9
E leaves, RO & CN collect -76.0 -32.3 -2.6 3.0
E leaves, RO & MA collect -73.0 -31.2 -2.5 2.9
E leaves, RO & Non-EU collect -41.0 -20.0 -1.4 1.6
E leaves, RO & UA collect -76.8 -32.5 -2.7 3.0
II Scenario
E stays and collects 57.5 12.9 1.9 -2.1
E leaves, nobody collects -92.9 -46.9 -3.2 3.6
E leaves and collects -19.4 -12.3 -0.7 0.7
E leaves, RO collect -81.7 -33.7 -2.8 3.2
E leaves, RO & AL collect -74.4 -31.1 -2.6 2.9
E leaves, RO & CN collect -77.2 -32.2 -2.7 3.0
E leaves, RO & MA collect -74.2 -31.1 -2.5 2.9
E leaves, RO & Non-EU collect -42.2 -20.1 -1.4 1.6
E leaves, RO & UA collect -78.0 -32.4 -2.7 3.0
III Scenario
E stays and collects -15.3 -7.5 -0.5 0.5
E leaves, nobody collects -101.1 -39.1 -3.3 3.8
E leaves and collects -51.4 -20.8 -1.7 1.9
E leaves, RO collect -89.9 -35.0 -2.9 3.3
E leaves, RO & AL collect -85.5 -33.4 -2.8 3.2
E leaves, RO & CN collect -87.1 -34.0 -2.9 3.2
E leaves, RO & MA collect -85.3 -33.3 -2.8 3.2
E leaves, RO & Non-EU collect -65.2 -25.9 -2.1 2.4
E leaves, RO & UA collect -87.5 -34.1 -2.9 3.2
Source: Own calculation based on EC (2015a), Eurostat (2013) MS, g = 1.5%, r = 3%
22The counter-intuitive result that the indicator fiscal gap shows a superior situation in
scenario I ‘’Everybody leaves, nobody collect” than in II ‘’Everybody leaves, nobody col-
lects” (-98.5 to -92.9) can be explained as follows. As the Romanian community in Italy
is by far the largest in numbers, the populations differ quite significantly in size between
both scenarios. Therefore, the lower fiscal gap is due to a smaller population size, especially
if all potential pensioners leave Italy. However, for the indicator future generations burden
the absolute value of the sustainability is again relevant as in this thought experiment the
gap is just closed by future generations (Eq. 2.9). Depending on the sizes of these gen-
erations, the outcome could differ from the revenue and transfer gap (basically depending
on the fertility rate). Therefore, it still holds that the situation is superior if in Italy born
foreigners are treated as Italians.
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2.6 Discussion of results and policy recommen-
dations
In this chapter, we use the methodology of Generational Accounting to
study the sustainability and the intergenerational effects of the Italian
current fiscal policy. Motivated by the important role that Italy is play-
ing nowadays as a country of arrival of international migration, we pro-
vide new evidences on the impact of immigration on the sustainability
of the Italian welfare state. A particular attention is devoted to the dis-
tinction of migrants resident in Italy with respect to their origin coun-
try to highlight their specific socio-economic characteristics and then, to
estimate the influence that each group has on the sustainability of pub-
lic finances. Hypothesis regarding the level of integration of foreigners,
their length of permanence on the Italian territory, and the possible col-
lection of retirement benefits in case of repatriation are made to create a
more realistic analysis that may be used to provide improvements to the
Italian social security system.
In our analysis, we find that, given the assumptions of the Ageing
Working Group of the European Commission (EC (2015a)), Italy is from
the perspective of fiscal sustainability in a formidable position, as the
fiscal gap in the standard scenario is only slightly positive. As Moog
et al. (2015) are showing Italy is even the European frontrunner given the
assumptions used. Nonetheless, if we loosen the assumptions especially
regarding health and long-term care expenditures, Italy joins the ranks
of European countries with a fiscal gap comparable to others on relative
good terms.
Moreover, we provide new empirical evidences indicating that en-
hancing integration of immigrants within economic realm allows greater
fiscal sustainability for the Italian economy. Actually, a complete eco-
nomic integration of the second generation of foreigners, that we simu-
late in the third scenario of our analysis by treating children with a mi-
gration background up to ten years old and future migrants newborns as
economically equal to Italian children, results in a massive improvement
of sustainability conditions corresponding to nearly 87 per cent of GDP.
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Furthermore, our examination shows that the current regime of ex-
treme hurdles in collecting accrued pension benefits for migrants who
repatriate gives Italy an ‘’unfair fiscal gain that worth around 30 percent
of GDP. As most sending countries are poorer than Italy, they and the
migrants in question have to care this burden. A possible solution that
may help in protecting social security rights of immigrants with no bi-
lateral agreement on social security may be the mandatory enrolment of
third country nationals to pension funds (they will not pay Pay-as-you-
go contributions to the Italian system). It will be a sort of pro-rata that
they will obtain for sure. Another refinement could be the provision of
a partial opting-out for young migrants. They can pay a contribution
quota to the Italian Pay-as-you-go system and a contribution quota to an
individual pension fund. Conversely, old migrants close to retirement
may pay contribution to their personal account only.
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Appendix A
A.1 Micro profiles
Figure 3 reports Italian micro profiles used in the Generational Account-
ing analysis.
Figure 4 illustrates data relative to wage and employment for each
foreign community of migrants, namely the Albanian, the Chinese, the
Moroccan, the non-EU citizens, the Romanian, and the Ukrainian. The
reported data, which are express in relation to Italian data, are rescaled
with Italian micro profiles in order to derive micro profiles for migrants.
Figure 3: Italian micro profiles
Continued on next page
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Continued on next page
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Continued on next page
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Figure 4: Employment and wage of different communities of migrants
(a) Albania
Continued on next page
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(b) China
(c) Morocco
Continued on next page41
Figure 4 – Continued from previous page
(d) Non-EU
(e) Romania
Continued on next page42
Figure 4 – Continued from previous page
(f) Ukraine
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Chapter 3
The potential costs of
Longevity Risk on Public
Pensions. Evidence from
Italian data
3.1 Introduction
In all industrialized countries, mortality rates experienced a sharp de-
cline during the last century (see for instance OECD (2014a)). The deter-
minants of such decline were a decrease in infant mortality and in mor-
tality at older ages, caused by progresses in medicine and improvements
in food and living habits. This increasing longevity trend has not slowed
down recently, as confirmed by recent analyses (OECD (2016)). In OECD
countries, life expectancy at 65 increased from 15.8 years in 2001 to 17.6
years in 2011 for males and from 19.4 to 21 years for females. The Ital-
ian experience is in line with these observations. As Figure 5 depicts,
mortality rates in Italy fell dramatically over the period 1900-2011. In
the period 2001-2011, for instance, life expectancy at age 65 increased
by 1.5 years for males and 1.2 years for females (OECD (2016)).
Most importantly, not only life expectancy has increased constantly
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Figure 5: Italian observed log mortality rates 1900-2011
Source: HMD (2015) database
in the last century, but this rise has exceeded all expectations (IMF (2012)).
No matter the approach chosen to provide forecasts, future mortality
rates seem to have been constantly underestimated by models.1 Such
discrepancy between actual and expected life spans, and its related un-
certainty, is called longevity risk. Indeed, while there are many posi-
tive aspects are related to the increase in the life expectancy of individ-
uals, there are some, at present highly debated, economic issues due to
1Different actuarial methods can be used to obtain mortality projections (see Booth and
Tickle (2008), and Pitacco et al. (2009)). Extrapolative methods, which can be either deter-
ministic or stochastic depending on weather forecasts are built by extending past trends or
by using probability distributions, make use of historical data to forecast future mortality
rates, i.e. they assume that future trends will essentially be a continuation of the past. Con-
versely, econometric models investigate drivers of mortality (e.g. economic, environmental
and epidemiological factors) in order to produce forecasts. Moreover, forecasting mortality
can be based on subjective opinions of experts.
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longevity risk. This risk, that is a trend risk, is relevant for individu-
als, companies and governments. One consequence it bears is the unex-
pected increase in public expenditures for the old-age, such as pensions
and health expenditure. On the one hand, individuals run the risk of
outliving their resources and being forced to reduce their standard of
living at old ages. On the other hand, public pension schemes, as well
as insurance companies and private pension funds, run the risk of pay-
ing out more than they expected to, because of unexpectedly longer life
times of their insureds.
In this paper, we focus on the relevance of longevity risk for public
pension providers. Indeed, they are affected by longevity risk, because
they need to rely on forecasts about the future evolution of mortality
rates, on which their calculations of pension benefits should be based,
as highlighted by Bisetti and Favero (2014). While they are able to cope
easily with the idiosyncratic, random variation risk by pooling different
individuals and relying on the law of large numbers, they seem to have
no strategy to defend themselves against this systematic risk. The Age-
ing Report of the EC (2015a) stresses how unexpected longevity gains
may cause severe financial troubles, in countries where the demographic
trends projected over the long term reveal a remarkable ageing pro-
cess. Actually, in those countries where the old-age dependency ratio2
is projected to increase in the future, the underestimation of mortality
improvements has already exacerbated the financial burden for govern-
ments providing public pensions (generally financed via a pay-as-you-go
system), forcing them to pay for retirement benefits even more than ex-
pected.3
In this chapter, we evaluate how uncertainty regarding future mor-
tality and life expectancy outcomes may affect a public pension budget.
We do this through an empirical analysis, based on a dataset of Italian
2The old age dependency ratio is the ratio of older dependents (people older than 64) to
the working-age population (those aged 15-64).
3According to the EC (2015a), EU countries are facing a significant aging problem. As
reported by Eurostat (2013) life expectancy at birth in 2060 will reach 84.8 years for males
and 89.1 years for females. Such aging process leads to a substantial increase in the old-
age dependency ratio, which is projected to raise from 27.8% to 50.1% over the period
2013-2060.
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pensioners. Using data from WHIP (2015) - Work Histories Italian Panel,
about the first state pension amounts paid to 43,641 Italians who retired
between 1985-2004, we estimate the pension expenditure borne by the
Italian government to pay their retirement benefits in the period 1985-
2011, making use of observed mortality rates from the HMD (2015) - Hu-
man Mortality Database. Afterwards, we compare such estimation with
the forecasted pension expenditure for the same sample of individuals,
obtained using forecasted mortality rates. These forecasts are obtained
using two well-known stochastic mortality models: the Lee and Carter
(1992) and the Cairns et al. (2006) model.4
In particular, we first compare the actual pension expenditure with
the one produced by applying the forecasts obtained using the Lee and
Carter (LC from now on) model, and the historical information avilable
in the base year 1984, at the beginning of the sample period. Then, as a
stress, we compare the real pension expenditure with the one obtained
by updating the LC forecasts every year. Finally, we compare the actual
pension expenditure with the one achieved by applying the Cairns et al.
model (CBD from now on) in the base year 1984.5
We find a consistent underestimation of improvements seen in mor-
tality and life expectancy, when forecasts are based on expectations. The
pension expenditure computed by taking into account observed mortal-
ity rates is 2.30% higher than the expenditure borne when an average
scenario predicted by the LC model in the base year 1984 is used, imply-
ing that people have lived longer than expected. However, when yearly
updates of the LC forecasts are employed, the underestimation reduces
to 0.61%. Finally, the application of the average scenario of the CBD
model leads to an underestimation of the real pension expenditure of
1.52%, one third lower than what we obtained with the LC model. Ap-
plying the CBD model widens also the variability around the central es-
timates, relative to the LC model.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 quantifies the pension
4For advantages and drawbacks of these two models, see for instance OECD (2014a).
5We apply the Cairns et al. model in the base year 1984 to forecast mortality rates for
the age range 60-90. Mortality rates for the ages 0-59 and 91-110 are those obtained with
the Lee and Carter model in the base year 1984.
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expenditure when observed mortality rates and forecasted mortality rates
based on Lee and Carter model on the base year 1984 are used. Sec-
tion 3.3 discusses robustness by applying yearly updates of the Lee and
Carter estimates and the Cairns et al. model to relevant ages. Finally,
Section 3.4 provides some comments and concludes.
3.2 Estimating the impact of longevity risk on
the Italian pension expenditure
The objective of this paper is to measure how uncertainty regarding fu-
ture mortality and life expectancy outcomes have affected the Italian
State budget when paying retirement benefits. We try to estimate the
actual individual retirement benefits paid by the state to a sample of
retirees and compare it with their forecasts at inception, according to
standard stochastic mortality models. We resort to the WHIP (2015) -
Work Histories Italian Panel database to have access to individual data
on a sample of retirees. The WHIP database on pensions6 covers the
time span 1985-2004 with a representative 1:180 sample, keeping track
of 43,641 individuals. Tables 4 and 5 summarize the composition of the
sample by year of retirement, showing that the number of retirees is be-
tween 1400 and 3000 for each year.
Unfortunately, the database does not provide us with the history of
the individuals in retirement, but only with the initial amount of their
pension. Hence, in Section 3.2.1 we estimate the pension expenditure
borne by the State for the whole sample of individuals, using the real-
ized mortality rates of the total Italian population to reproduce the pat-
tern of deaths in our sample, which we consider as representative of the
whole retirees’ population. In Section 3.2.2 we estimate the pension ex-
penditure, according to actuarial projections regarding the development
of mortality rates, based on the data available at the beginning of our
observation period, 1984.
6The types of retirement benefit paid are: Dipendenti, Autonomi, Agricoli, Altre gestioni,
Pensioni sociali, Trattamenti diretti, Rendite Inail, Superstiti.
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Table 4: Number of pensioners by year of retirement
Year of Retirement Number of pensioners
1985 1401
1986 1592
1987 1822
1988 1958
1989 2002
1990 2049
1991 2262
1992 2884
1993 1878
1994 2754
1995 2295
1996 2965
1997 2591
1998 2288
1999 2570
2000 2154
2001 2200
2002 1927
2003 1984
2004 2065
Total 43,641
Source: WHIP (2015) database
Table 5: Number of pensioners by year of retirement
Year of retirement
1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004
Number of pensioners 8775 11,827 12,709 10,330
Source: WHIP (2015) database
3.2.1 Estimating the actual pension expenditure
To provide an estimate of the actual pension expenditure for the retirees
in our sample, we use the following procedure. For each individual in
our sample, retired between 1985 and 2004, we project the initial pen-
sion amount until 2011, adjusting such an amount for the annual aver-
age inflation rate.7 We then aggregate the individual amounts by year of
birth of the retirees. As a result, we obtain the pension expenditure borne
up to 2011 for 83 cohorts of individuals born between 1902-1984. Then,
we consider the pattern of deaths in our sample, by applying to each co-
hort, the observed survival rates provided by HMD (2015) for the Italian
7See www.inflation.eu.
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population. We multiply the cohort inflated pension expenditures by
these survival rates and obtain an estimate of the total pension expen-
diture for our sample up to 2011, aggregating across cohorts and years
(1985-2011). Our estimate for the 43,641 sample individuals amounts to
6,354,610,346 Euro.
Table 6 disentangles the pension expenditure by year of retirement.
The first years, even if more distant from the end of our observation
period, have a relatively low expenditure due to the smaller number of
individuals in the sample.
Table 6: Pension expenditure (in Euro) for sample retirees in the period
1985-2011 (by year of retirement 1985-2004)
Year of Retirement Expenditure
1985 200,969,315
1986 234,512,955
1987 267,027,489
1988 294,324,699
1989 303,963,558
1990 328,435,410
1991 351,769,440
1992 522,936,015
1993 267,478,388
1994 508,229,840
1995 378,347,963
1996 466,544,569
1997 418,508,243
1998 313,819,978
1999 331,606,150
2000 252,950,271
2001 264,320,748
2002 227,568,902
2003 211,640,947
2004 209,655,464
Total 6,354,610,346
Source: Own calculation
3.2.2 Forecasted pension expenditure: mortality rates from
the Lee and Carter (1992) model
We now want to compare our estimates of the actual pension benefits
paid to our sample of retirees with some forecasts of the expenditure,
based on actuarial models. These forecasts are relevant, since the pen-
sion amount granted to an individual as a public pension is not subject
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to revision, if the survivorship unexpectedly changes. Nonetheless, ac-
tuarial fairness would encourage to fix such pension amount appropri-
ately, based on as-accurate-as-possible estimates of the residual lifetimes.
Discrepancies between expected and realized mortality rates are exactly
what we refer to as longevity risk, and determine the unexpected excess
payment to pensioners in the case of improved longevity relative to fore-
casts. First, we produce forecasts based on 1984 data, using the most
well-known stochastic mortality model, the Lee and Carter one.8
The Lee and Carter model (LC from now on), describes the age-period
surface of log mortality-rates log(mxt) as
log(mxt) = ax + bxkt + x,t . (3.1)
The vector ax can be interpreted as an average age profile, the vector kt
tracks mortality changes over time, the vector bx determines how much
each age group changes when kt changes, and the error term x,t , reflects
particular age-specific historical influences not captured in the model.
It is well-known that the above model is over-parametrized and, thus,
constraints need to be imposed in order to identify it. Following the
standard identification procedure, we impose bx’s to sum to one and kt’s
to sum to zero. As a consequence of this particular choice, ax’s are the
average log rates.
By using Italian mortality data from 1935 to 1984,9 we estimate ax
averaging log-rates over time and bx and kt via singular value decom-
position of the residuals. This method approximates a matrix as the
product of two vectors. However, as argued in Lee and Carter (1992),
the fitted death rates derived in this way generally will not lead to the
actual numbers of deaths when applied to given population age distri-
bution. For this reason, by making use of Eq. 3.1 above, we apply a
two-step estimation procedure for kt , taking ax and bx estimates from the
first step as given. We thereby find an estimate of kt such that, for each
8Obviously, in 1984, the Lee and Carter model had not yet been formulated, but our
choice of using the Lee and Carter model is justified by the fact that the Italian Statistical
Institute, ISTAT, now makes use of such a model to forecast age-specific mortality rates.
9Even if HMD (2015) database provides Italian mortality data since 1900, we chose to
discard the period 1900-1935 because it is too far away in time.
52
year, given the actual population age distribution, the implied number
of deaths will equal the actual number of deaths. On top of estimating
the model, we are interested in using it to forecast mortality. Forecast-
ing requires the selection of the dynamics of the evolution in time of the
adjusted kt . It is usually modeled using ARIMA time series methods,
and, most commonly, as a random walk with drift, i.e. an ARIMA(0,1,0).
We perform the required tests and select this hypothesis to forecast our
mortality rates as well, estimating appropriately the parameters of the
process. Table 7 collects the whole set of estimated parameters.
We then simulate 10,000 paths of kt for the years 1985-2011 to obtain
a simulated distribution of forecasted mortality rates. Simulated kts are
combined with the vectors ax and bx, estimated according to the proce-
dure described above to produce forecasts of age-specific mortality rates
for the years 1985-2011.
The fan-chart in Figure 6 illustrates the historical log mortality rates
for the period 1935-1984 (HMD (2015) database), and our forecasted dis-
tribution of log mortality rates for the period 1985-2011 for a 65 years-
old individual. As we can easily see from the figure, the trend of log mor-
tality rates for future years 1985-2011 is decreasing, implying that the
observed increases in life expectancy are captured by the model. How-
ever, the figure also shows the remarkable uncertainty in the evolution of
mortality rates in time, especially when the objective is to forecast their
value in a relatively distant future.
Having obtained a model-based forecast of the mortality rates of the
Italian population using 1984 data, we can now produce the estimated
forecasts of the pension expenditure of the retirees in our sample. These
forecasts represents the future scenarios of expenditures that, given the
pension payments granted to pensioners, the state may have expected to
face according to 1984 actuarial mortality projections.10
As a base-line scenario, we consider the age-specific averages of our
10,000 simulations. We use these average log-mortality rates to calculate
the age-specific survival rates by cohort of birth and we apply them to the
10Actuarial projections used for state pension calculations have usually been updated in
Italy with a frequency of 8 to 10 years, thus justifying to some extent our exercise.
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Table 7: Estimated parameters of the LC model
Parameters ax and bx
Age ax bx Age ax bx Age ax bx
0 -3,103 0,016 37 -6,070 0,013 74 -2,814 0,004
1 -5,339 0,031 38 -6,003 0,012 75 -2,707 0,004
2 -6,159 0,026 39 -5,942 0,011 76 -2,598 0,004
3 -6,583 0,022 40 -5,853 0,011 77 -2,496 0,004
4 -6,841 0,020 41 -5,791 0,010 78 -2,386 0,004
5 -7,033 0,019 42 -5,715 0,010 79 -2,279 0,005
6 -7,138 0,018 43 -5,641 0,009 80 -2,180 0,004
7 -7,257 0,018 44 -5,562 0,009 81 -2,086 0,004
8 -7,349 0,017 45 -5,470 0,008 82 -1,980 0,004
9 -7,406 0,017 46 -5,389 0,008 83 -1,879 0,004
10 -7,443 0,018 47 -5,310 0,007 84 -1,779 0,004
11 -7,433 0,017 48 -5,221 0,006 85 -1,693 0,004
12 -7,394 0,017 49 -5,141 0,006 86 -1,600 0,004
13 -7,324 0,016 50 -5,044 0,006 87 -1,513 0,004
14 -7,172 0,015 51 -4,968 0,005 88 -1,419 0,004
15 -7,016 0,015 52 -4,886 0,005 89 -1,322 0,004
16 -6,868 0,014 53 -4,806 0,005 90 -1,256 0,003
17 -6,767 0,014 54 -4,716 0,004 91 -1,183 0,003
18 -6,606 0,017 55 -4,637 0,004 92 -1,100 0,003
19 -6,535 0,018 56 -4,548 0,004 93 -1,024 0,003
20 -6,508 0,020 57 -4,465 0,004 94 -0,953 0,003
21 -6,478 0,020 58 -4,379 0,004 95 -0,898 0,003
22 -6,466 0,020 59 -4,290 0,004 96 -0,825 0,003
23 -6,447 0,020 60 -4,194 0,004 97 -0,774 0,002
24 -6,447 0,019 61 -4,114 0,003 98 -0,705 0,003
25 -6,445 0,019 62 -4,013 0,004 99 -0,572 0,002
26 -6,451 0,019 63 -3,925 0,004 100 -0,598 0,002
27 -6,453 0,018 64 -3,832 0,004 101 -0,557 0,002
28 -6,445 0,017 65 -3,736 0,004 102 -0,539 0,003
29 -6,428 0,017 66 -3,643 0,004 103 -0,429 0,004
30 -6,387 0,017 67 -3,545 0,004 104 -0,466 0,004
31 -6,370 0,016 68 -3,443 0,004 105 -0,223 0,009
32 -6,331 0,015 69 -3,341 0,004 106 -0,207 0,006
33 -6,287 0,015 70 -3,233 0,004 107 0,022 0,006
34 -6,241 0,014 71 -3,138 0,004 108 0,096 0,000
35 -6,190 0,014 72 -3,026 0,004 109 0,185 -0,003
36 -6,124 0,013 73 -2,921 0,004 110 0,052 -0,001
Parameter kt ARIMA (0,1,0) Model
Drift Variance
-2,54492 54,8979
(1.03341) (13.0598)
Source: Own calculation
pension expenditure by cohort, as explained in the previous subsection.
As a result, we obtain the total pension expenditure by year of birth,
discounted by the survival rates so obtained, from the retirement date
up to 2011.
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Figure 6: LC forecasted log mortality rates at age 65: years 1985-2011
Source: Own calculation
As before, aggregating by cohorts and years, we obtain the total ex-
pected payment for the whole sample of pensioners up to 2011, which is
6,208,473,761 Euro. Comparing this figure with our estimate of the real-
ized pension expenditure, we find that this estimate is 2.30% lower. This
provides us with a measure of the effects of longevity risk on our sam-
ple: the best estimate of the expenditure, that is the amount that, given
the profile of pension payments, the state expected to pay to retirees,
was indeed about 150 million euros lower than the actual payment. This
underestimation is the result of an unpredicted rise in the average life ex-
pectancy of pensioners, that even a rather sophisticated actuarial model
such as the LC one could not capture.
Now, instead of taking the average of the 10,000 possible forecasted
age-specific log mortality rates for the period 1985-2011, we take differ-
ent percentiles of such log mortality rates. Taking a low percentile of the
simulated distribution implies assuming a worst-case scenario for the
annuity provider, considering that the retirees will experience mortality
rates lower than the expectations. Table 8 presents the forecasted expen-
ditures, total and by year of retirement, obtained selecting different per-
centiles of our simulated age-specific mortality rates, and compares them
with the actual estimate presented in Section 3.2.1. Underestimation of
the expenditure is obtained even when selecting a very low percentile.
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At the 5th percentile, representing a 1 over 20 years possible scenario,
the forecasted overall expenditure is 1.04% lower than our estimate of
the actual one. It is interesting to notice that this underestimation is ob-
tained due to a too low variability of the mortality rates in the long run.
Indeed, the estimates that are more distant, such as the expenditure of
the 2004 retirees, are too low with respect to their actual counterparts.
This is due to an excessively small variability in the forecasted mortality
rates produced by the model.
Table 8: Forecasted pension expenditure (in Euro) with the LC model: base
year 1984
Year LC Average LC 5th %ile LC 10th %ile LC 30th %ile Realized
1985 199,003,999 203,498,775 202,569,630 200,508,528 200,969,315
1986 231,506,287 236,613,552 235,557,111 233,218,222 234,512,955
1987 262,951,867 268,333,305 267,220,433 264,759,766 267,027,489
1988 289,022,079 294,798,664 293,603,204 290,965,105 294,324,699
1989 297,727,644 303,344,935 302,181,972 299,619,623 303,963,558
1990 320,982,986 326,687,311 325,506,133 322,906,110 328,435,410
1991 343,192,847 348,868,478 347,693,372 345,108,364 351,769,440
1992 510,067,308 517,470,754 515,939,554 512,569,006 522,936,015
1993 260,322,025 264,217,705 263,411,596 261,637,648 267,478,388
1994 494,472,861 500,804,655 499,497,137 496,611,973 508,229,840
1995 368,551,735 372,732,006 371,869,990 369,962,938 378,347,963
1996 454,250,861 458,986,580 458,010,043 455,847,276 466,544,569
1997 407,383,629 411,324,129 410,509,996 408,709,932 418,508,243
1998 305,938,131 308,537,065 307,999,116 306,811,993 313,819,978
1999 323,165,190 325,710,842 325,181,396 324,019,458 331,606,150
2000 246,673,676 248,419,700 248,054,577 247,258,290 252,950,271
2001 257,989,299 259,620,595 259,277,519 258,534,137 264,320,748
2002 222,486,746 223,697,787 223,442,054 222,890,445 227,568,902
2003 207,130,147 208,124,842 207,913,817 207,461,007 211,640,947
2004 205,654,444 206,466,042 206,293,604 205,924,037 209,655,464
Total 6,208,473,761 6,288,257,723 6,271,732,255 6,235,323,860 6,354,610,346
Error 2.30% 1.04% 1.30% 1.88% -
Source: Own calculation
We now turn to analyze possible improvements of the forecasts, to see
whether and how they may limit the longevity risk issue we highlighted.
3.3 Robustness
In this Section, we consider two robustness checks to our results, when
improving the forecasts in two directions. First, in Subsection 3.3.1 in-
stead of using a fixed 1984-based forecast of mortality rates for the whole
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period 1985-2011, we update the estimate of the mortality rate LC model.
Second, in Subsection 3.3.2 we try to forecast the mortality rates of the
ages 60-90 with the Cairns et al. model, that is more appropriate to de-
scribe the features of those specific ages.
3.3.1 Forecasted pension expenditure: yearly updates of
LC estimates of mortality rates
As a first robustness check for our results, we update our estimates of
the LC model every year starting from 1985 to 2004 (retirement window
of sample retirees) and use these estimates to produce updated forecasts
each year. More specifically, we use the 1984 forecast to compute the
State pension expenditure borne in the period 1985-2011 for those re-
tired in 1985. Then, we use the 1985 forecast to calculate the State ex-
penditure of retirement benefits paid in the period 1986-2011 to those
retired in 1986, and so on. This process is consistent with the idea that, in
principle, a public pension provider could fix the initial pension amount
for his pensioners using an actuarial fairness principle and basing the es-
timates of their expected residual lifetimes on information available up
to the moment of retirement. Indeed, these forecasts should obviously
be more precise than the ones obtained in the previous section, when the
mortality model was estimated only once and for all at the beginning of
the observation period.
Table 9 collects the results of this exercise. As expected, the yearly
update of the estimates improves the results. However, the average total
forecasted pension expenditure for the period 1985-2011 obtained by
applying a yearly estimation of mortality rates amounts to 6,315,525,752
Euro, i.e. the 0.61% lower than the actual pension expenditure.
This figure is indeed closer to our estimate of the realized expendi-
ture, but still evidences that even the yearly update of the forecasts does
not immunize entirely against the risk of unexpected longevity rises. In-
deed, it would be necessary to consider a ”prudent” percentile of the
distribution of mortality rates ranging between 10 and 30 to match the
realized expenditure. This is important to keep in mind, as recent pen-
sion reforms attached the revision of pension amounts and retirement
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age to longevity improvements. This obviously reduces the risk of run-
ning into higher-than-predicted costs, but does not entirely avoid it.
Table 9: Forecasted pension expenditure (in Euro) with the LC model:
yearly updates of estimates
Year LCyu Average LCyu 5th %ile LCyu 10th %ile LCyu 30th %ile Realized
1985 198,951,584 203,524,721 202,581,905 200,441,475 200,969,315
1986 231,413,279 236,573,692 235,484,186 233,153,730 234,512,955
1987 264,002,148 269,294,079 268,209,364 265,711,703 267,027,489
1988 292,029,682 297,541,217 296,361,615 293,827,020 294,324,699
1989 301,151,466 306,395,774 305,300,843 302,865,779 303,963,558
1990 326,257,527 331,475,194 330,379,981 327,967,859 328,435,410
1991 348,962,503 354,010,003 352,941,029 350,675,867 351,769,440
1992 518,593,723 525,057,801 523,575,155 520,790,381 522,936,015
1993 266,228,471 269,435,821 268,774,313 267,288,609 267,478,388
1994 505,052,213 510,120,673 508,989,100 506,743,869 508,229,840
1995 376,966,482 379,350,347 378,658,352 377,135,156 378,347,963
1996 463,818,094 467,306,918 466,510,026 464,910,444 466,544,569
1997 416,521,617 419,479,038 418,807,802 417,529,296 418,508,243
1998 312,490,960 314,382,397 313,973,988 313,133,220 313,819,978
1999 329,909,721 331,811,893 331,410,513 330,530,770 331,606,150
2000 251,997,377 253,312,423 253,020,877 252,442,193 252,950,271
2001 263,818,196 264,971,389 264,734,704 264,216,324 264,320,748
2002 227,382,182 228,208,336 228,043,633 227,656,621 227,568,902
2003 211,556,869 212,239,414 212,099,413 211,776,576 211,640,947
2004 209,321,648 209,886,047 209,771,608 209,504,059 209,655,464
Total 6,315,525,752 6,384,377,187 6,369,628,416 6,338,278,105 6,354,610,346
Error 0.61% −0.46% −0.23% 0.25% -
Source: Own calculation
3.3.2 Forecasted pension expenditure: mortality rates from
the Cairns et al. (2006) model
In this section, we improve our estimates by describing the evolution of
mortality at ages 60-90 using the Cairns et al. model (CBD from now on).
As already mentioned, differently from the LC model, the CBD model
was developed with the aim of providing more accurate mortality pro-
jections for older ages, who constitute indeed the bulk of the pension
expenditure of each pension system or pension fund. Indeed, accord-
ing to Biffi and Clemente (2014), the CBD model is the best approach to
model mortality at high ages for Italy.
According to the CBD model, the probability of death, qx,t is de-
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scribed by the following expression:
logit(qx,t) = k
[1]
t + k
[2]
t (x − x¯) + ex,t . (3.2)
The logit of the age-specific probability of death is modeled as a linear
function of age x, where x¯ represents the mean age in the sample range.
The intercept k[1]t and the slope k
[2]
t are stochastic processes. We select
them to be correlated random walks, as in the original formulation of the
model. The former affects every age in the same way, while the impact
of k[2]t varies according to age, being higher for ages distant from the av-
erage age in the sample, i.e. 75. The error term ex,t reflects the historical
(age-specific) patterns not captured by the model.
We apply this model to forecast the mortality rates of the ages 60-90 in
our sample, while we maintain our original LC estimates and forecasts
for the other ages. We thus estimate the model using the Italian mor-
tality data from 1935 to 1984, estimating k[1]t and k
[2]
t , whose values are
collected in Table 10.
The trend of k[1]t is reducing overtime, implying that the mortality
rates have been decreasing at all ages. Conversely, the values of k[2]t
are increasing overtime, meaning that the mortality improvements have
been greater at medium ages (around 60) and at higher ages rather than
at central ones (around 75) in recent years.
Given the estimated parameters, we simulate k[1]t and k
[2]
t and com-
bine them according to Eq. 3.2 to produce forecasts of mortality rates in
the age range 60-90 for the period 1985-2011. The fan-chart in Figure
7 illustrates the historical log mortality rates for the period 1935-1984
(HMD database), and the 10,000 forecasted log mortality rates for the
period 1985-2011 of a 65 years-old individual. One can easily see, by
comparing Figure 7 and Figure 6, that the CBD model produces fore-
casts that are more variable than those obtained with the LC model.
Following the same procedure described in the previous sections, we
compute the pension expenditures in an average scenario and different
percentile-forecasts of mortality rates. Table 11 collects the total fore-
casted expenditure and the forecasts for each cohort of retirees, under
different mortality scenarios. In the average scenario, the forecasted ex-
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Table 10: Estimated parameters k[1]t and k
[2]
t of the CBD model
Year k[1]t k
[2]
t Year k
[1]
t k
[2]
t
1936 -2,343531916 0,109697942 1961 -2,712524269 0,1125323
1937 -2,337586844 0,108065883 1962 -2,628668625 0,114938986
1938 -2,328644817 0,113056448 1963 -2,631985253 0,113833747
1939 -2,342518962 0,115210143 1964 -2,717645656 0,10988918
1940 -2,283113054 0,117805985 1965 -2,660982155 0,112455753
1941 -2,279204176 0,119428198 1966 -2,735162324 0,110999325
1942 -2,248999222 0,119224772 1967 -2,719640192 0,111166669
1943 -2,265095499 0,116478356 1968 -2,681111379 0,113701263
1944 -2,242983598 0,11920428 1969 -2,691542995 0,1036612
1945 -2,377431071 0,116593622 1970 -2,750169083 0,108895078
1946 -2,500578739 0,115383117 1971 -2,767043494 0,110139067
1947 -2,505131407 0,112378237 1972 -2,789009666 0,108621377
1948 -2,548121417 0,110889088 1973 -2,748810592 0,113527407
1949 -2,537011453 0,112915383 1974 -2,797958662 0,111896011
1950 -2,603186258 0,111832384 1975 -2,759335907 0,111635557
1951 -2,508076906 0,115300696 1976 -2,784950585 0,112267495
1952 -2,518831522 0,116950192 1977 -2,813412999 0,11335119
1953 -2,514952372 0,11526673 1978 -2,843992739 0,111612077
1954 -2,635455672 0,113325938 1979 -2,871439288 0,111991897
1955 -2,642625361 0,112552946 1980 -2,857448758 0,112071886
1956 -2,496106561 0,118907274 1981 -2,882303731 0,112304065
1957 -2,580358018 0,111635482 1982 -2,928126908 0,110904174
1958 -2,666976861 0,111250593 1983 -2,894531256 0,114825542
1959 -2,708532356 0,110807465 1984 -2,97734246 0,112089278
1960 -2,652875548 0,114798641
Source: Own calculation
Figure 7: CBD forecasted log mortality rates at age 65: years 1985-2011
Source: Own calculation
penditure for the whole sample of individuals is 6,257,819,903 Euro,
1.52% lower than the actual pension expenditure. The larger variabil-
ity in the mortality dynamics captured by the CBD model relative to the
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LC one leads to a better result on the tail scenarios: when the 5th per-
centile of each age-specific mortality rate is considered, the forecasted
expenditure exceeds the realized one by 0.25%.
Table 11: Forecasted pension expenditure (in Euro) with the CBD model:
base year 1984
Year CBD Average CBD 5th %ile CBD 10th %ile CBD 30th %ile Realized
1985 201,105,097 207,877,143 206,499,849 203,400,992 200,969,315
1986 233,962,706 241,630,518 240,071,462 236,564,002 234,512,955
1987 265,636,855 273,590,700 271,975,438 268,340,381 267,027,489
1988 292,009,424 300,514,859 298,789,413 294,902,526 294,324,699
1989 300,732,432 308,928,064 307,265,183 303,522,516 303,963,558
1990 324,147,870 332,387,642 330,715,271 326,955,491 328,435,410
1991 346,484,665 354,595,258 352,949,317 349,250,787 351,769,440
1992 514,543,141 524,874,894 522,777,993 518,070,314 522,936,015
1993 262,709,730 268,272,753 267,144,008 264,605,817 267,478,388
1994 498,748,113 507,504,533 505,725,706 501,734,426 508,229,840
1995 371,387,905 377,092,234 375,931,738 373,331,190 378,347,963
1996 457,652,533 464,056,633 462,752,553 459,831,409 466,544,569
1997 410,312,806 415,662,556 414,570,586 412,128,305 418,508,243
1998 307,873,733 311,352,741 310,640,576 309,052,233 313,819,978
1999 325,152,307 328,577,106 327,874,216 326,308,289 331,606,150
2000 248,101,720 250,443,955 249,961,761 248,889,815 252,950,271
2001 259,367,580 261,546,291 261,096,104 260,098,145 264,320,748
2002 223,505,240 225,105,233 224,773,223 224,039,984 227,568,902
2003 208,025,096 209,342,129 209,067,703 208,463,912 211,640,947
2004 206,360,949 207,412,550 207,191,488 206,710,370 209,655,464
Totals 6,257,819,903 6,370,767,792 6,347,773,584 6,296,200,901 6,354,610,346
Error 1.52% -0.25% 0.11% 0.92% -
Source: Own calculation
3.4 Conclusions
In this chapter we provided evidence about the relevance of longevity
risk for public pension issuers. Based on Italian data, we quantified a se-
vere underestimation of mortality rates over a 30 year span, when fore-
casts are based on central estimates provided by sound actuarial stochas-
tic mortality models. Our results show that, in our sample, not only
actual pension payments have exceeded expectations, but that actual ex-
penditure turned out to be a very low percentile of the forecasted distri-
bution.
Our real-world based experiment clarifies the importance of consid-
ering the uncertainty in predictions. Even though longevity is perceived
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as a threat that builds slowly over time, it is now general consensus that
it needs to be tackled, to prevent further deterioration of countries fi-
nancial stability. Measures able to avoid potential large negative effects
on private and public sector finances are needed. The debate on how to
reduce the risks related to aging and to the underestimation of longevity
improvements for public pensions has recently gained attention. IMF
(2012), for instance, proposes several potential solutions, aimed at re-
ducing the threat that longevity risk represents for financial viability.
First, longevity risk, to which public pension systems are highly exposed,
as we showed in our results, can be shared to some extent between the
private sector, the public sector, and individuals, through pension re-
forms. An example of such sharing mechanism is retirement age index-
ation to life expectancy improvements, that has been adopted recently
by some countries, such as Italy. A more complex, but effective, solution
may consist in allowing governments, individuals and private pension
providers to transfer the longevity risk to capital market participants
and private companies (see for instance Blake and Burrows (2001) and
Blake et al. (2014)). However, most importantly, a careful investigation
about the uncertainty regarding mortality rates forecasts is necessary. A
correct, threat-minimizing valuation of pension benefits appears to be
crucial for public pension systems, just as well as for private ones, in
reducing financial instability issues.
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Chapter 4
Intragenerational
Redistribution in a Funded
pension system
4.1 Introduction
According to OECD (2014b) and OECD (2015), many OECD countries
are currently facing a remarkable aging process which is driven by in-
creases in life expectancy and declines in fertility rates. The observed
increases in the median age of the population, which is projected to con-
tinue raising over the years ahead, have resulted in an increase in the
old-age dependency ratio.1 Actually, according to OECD (2015), the de-
mographic dependency ratio, equal to 14 in 1950, reached the value of
28 in 2015, and it is projected to nearly double in 2075 reaching the value
of 55.
The increase in the old-age dependency ratio should be seriously taken
into account by governments who are financing public pensions via the
Pay-as-you-go system (PAYG). In a PAYG system, active population fi-
1The demographic old-age dependency ratio is defined as the number of individuals
aged 65 and over per 100 people of working age defined as those aged between 20 and 64
OECD (2015)).
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nance pensions of same-period retirees based on the promise that they
will receive a similar treatment by future workers. Due to this working
mechanism, a decline in population growth may jeopardize the finan-
cial viability of the system itself since it reduces the likelihood that the
promise can be maintained in the future.2 Actually, many OECD coun-
tries providing PAYG-financed public pensions will experience financial
troubles caused by the retirement of the Baby Boom generation, which is
a cohort much larger than the one that followed in the workforce.
According to World Bank (2005), traditional strategies adopted in
order to make public pension promises more affordable within a PAYG
system, i.e. adjustments in the pension eligibility age, in indexation ar-
rangements and in the benefits accrual rate, are often proved unsatisfac-
tory.
In search for sustainability, some countries (e.g., Italy and Sweden)
have introduced the Notional defined contribution (NDC) scheme. By
maintaining a PAYG-finance, the NDC plan provides benefits that bear
an actuarial relationship to individual lifetime contributions.3 Never-
theless, due to demographic changes, the introduction of the NDC can
only partially ease PAYG system’s sustainability tension.
Therefore, in a context of falling fertility and rising longevity one
should seriously consider not merely an amendment of the system but a
replacement of such a system with a more sustainable and a fair one.
The most credited solution to the solvency problem originated by
PAYG system in an aging economy, is the privatization of social secu-
rity, i.e. the shift from the PAYG to the Fully-funded system (FF) where
each individual builds up her own pension by contributing to a personal
account.4 However, the adoption of a FF system does not come with dis-
2According to Samuelson (1958), Aaron (1966) and Samuelson (1975), the PAYG system,
defined as the social contract between generations, is desirable only when each generations
maintain positive real rates of return on contributions, which happens so long as real earn-
ings growth and population growth remain positive.
3See for example Disney et al. (1999), Holzmann et al. (2006) and World Bank (2005).
4We refer to FF defined contribution schemes where the post-retirement consumption,
given life expectancy and the interest rate, is determined only by the amount of contri-
butions paid into the fund. In an aging economy the FF defined benefit scheme, that pre-
commit to pay a defined pension benefit no matter on the value of assets accumulated, runs
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advantages and for this reason there is no common opinion in the litera-
ture on whether PAYG systems should be entirely replaced with funded
systems.5
In particular, in addition to the financial viability of the pension
system, which has become of a primary importance, any social welfare
program has to guarantee an adequate standard of living in retirement
(OECD (2014b)).
In this regard, the FF system is able to improve financial sustain-
ability but, due to its working mechanism and contrarily to unfunded
schemes, it does not accomplish poverty relief and redistribution,6 which
are two of the most important objectives pursued by social security sys-
tems.7 Actually, the financial unsustainable PAYG system is able to en-
sure an adequate income throughout retirement by including different
types of redistribution, namely the intergenerational and the intragener-
ational one.8 The former redistributes resources across generations (e.g.
a reduction in the contribution rate of current workers requires an in-
crease in contributions paid by future generations or a decrease in the
amount of their pension benefits). The latter, instead, allocates resources
across different income levels within the same generation (e.g., by guar-
anteeing a higher replacement rate to low income earners). Similarly, the
NDC, by maintaining a PAYG finance, provide intergenerational redistri-
bution and very slight forms of within-cohort redistribution, namely the
one from men to women, the one achieved through survivor benefits,
and the one obtained through credits for periods spent out of the paid
labor force.9
the solvency risk (OECD (2014b)).
5Among others, see Sinn (2000) for a general comparison between funded and unfunded
systems.
6Blake (2006) argues that even the FF provides slight forms of redistribution. In defined
benefit plans early leavers subsidize long stayers, while in defined contribution schemes
poor people subsidize rich people, and (if there is a unisex annuity rate) men subsidize
women.
7See Barr and Diamond (2006).
8See Disney (1996), and Ignacio Conde-Ruiz and Profeta (2007).
9According to World Bank (2005), the redistribution from men to women arises from
the use of unisex annuity factors even though women tend to live longer. Conversely,
the redistribution via survivor benefits occurs because annuity factors do not include the
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In the attempt to overcome the solvency problems induced by PAYG,
and to pursue the objective of retirement-income adequacy unmet by the
FF, we introduce a modified version of the pure FF system that incorpo-
rates an intragenerational redistributive component.
To analyze the effects of such modification, a general equilibrium,
two-period overlapping generations model is developed. Individuals de-
cide how much to work and how much to save for old age consumption.
The returns to private savings and wages are determined by the profit
maximizing behavior of a firm with standard Cobb-Douglas production
function. Since a representative agent framework does not capture intra-
generational redistribution, we present a model with two productivity
types. Differences in the skill level (and thus in the income level) among
workers translate into differences in the magnitude of capital accumula-
tion and labor supply distortion.
According to our results, the unfunded system generates labor supply
distortions and depresses physical capital accumulation. More precisely,
in the numerical investigation of the theoretical model we propose, the
labor distortion in the PAYG NDC arises from government’s decision to
revaluate workers contributions at a rate that is lower than the market
interest rate.10 Therefore, by offering a lower amount of labor, the in-
dividual depresses his income and his savings. At the equilibrium, this
reduction in saving causes the aggregate capital stock to fall. Conversely,
the pure funded system depresses neither labor supply nor capital accu-
mulation since individuals recognize that contributions paid during the
entire working career are a form of private savings. The most interesting
result of our model is that the intragenerational redistribution carried
out in the modified version of the original funded system slightly in-
crease physical capital accumulation with respect to the pure FF case,
without significantly reducing labor supply incentives. Hence, the pro-
number and age of dependents.
10Even though the capital stock in the balanced growth path of the Diamond (1965)
model may exceed the golden-rule level, implying a dynamically inefficient economy, the
realistic parameter values we chose in our numerical simulation ensure that the interest
rate is always greater than the PAYG NDC returns, implying a dynamically efficient econ-
omy.
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posed modified funded pension system, which incorporates a redistri-
bution share aimed at contributing to the creation of minimum living
standards pillar to low-income pensioners, seems to be a good compro-
mise to pursue the objectives of reducing labor supply distortions and
enhancing physical capital accumulation.
The chapter is organized as follows. The model is presented in Sec-
tion 4.2. Section 4.3 provides the closed economy general equilibrium
analysis alongside the main analytical findings. Section 4.4 completes
the analysis with a numerical investigation and Section 4.5 provides con-
clusions.
4.2 The Model
We present a two-period overlapping generations (OLG) model a` la Di-
amond (1965) with endogenous labor supply to study the impact of dif-
ferent pension schemes.11 We consider a PAYG NDC in opposition to a
Modified Fully Funded (MFF) scheme, a funded system that embodies
a redistributive component. We consider a closed economy where firms
produce a single homogeneous good that can be used for both consump-
tion and investment. Moreover, capital and labor are used as inputs in a
constant returns Cobb-Douglas technology. Finally, individuals differ in
their skill level.
This section starts with Subsection 4.2.1 on individuals optimal sav-
ing and labour supply decisions, while in Subsection 4.2.2 the produc-
tion function of the economy is presented. Lastly, in Subsection 4.2.3
we analyze the public budget constraint under the two aforementioned
pension systems.
4.2.1 Households Decision
In our OLG setting people work in the first period of their life and retire
in the second. As usual, the population growth rate is equal to Nt+1Nt = 1 +
ρt+1 with ρt+1 > −1, whereNt denotes the population at time t. Moreover,
11See also Breyer and Straub (1993) and Sommacal (2006).
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by assuming that generations are non-altruistic, we rule out bequests.
Individuals differ in their productivity level hi , which can be either high
or low, i.e. i = H,L. In particular, we assume that a fixed fraction λL ∈
(0,1) of the total population belongs to the low skilled class, while the
other fixed fraction λH = 1 − λL belongs to the high skilled class. The
income level of an individual i in his working period t (yi,t) is equal to
wthi li,t where wt is the wage rate per efficient unit of labor and li,t is
the labor supply provided in the same working period by an individual
of type i. In our analysis, it is assumed that 0 < hL < hH . Both types
of individuals contribute to the public pension system when young and
receive pension benefits when retired. The pension contribution rate is
exogenous and equal to τ where 0 < τ < 1.
To keep things tractable, we take a convenient and quite standard
specification for the utility function: we assume it quasilinear in labor.12
Consequently, the individual maximization problem becomes:
max
li,t ,si,t ,ci,t ,ci,t+1
Ui,t = ln
ci,t − l2i,t2
+ βlnci,t+1
s.t. ci,t + si,t = (1− τ)wthi li,t
ci,t+1 = Rt+1si,t + pi,t+1
(4.1)
In the first period the young working generations allocate their after
tax wage income (1−τ)wthi li,t between consumption ci,t and savings si,t .
The old retired generation receives their previous savings si,t plus the
return rt+1, where Rt+1 = 1 + rt+1, and a retirement benefit pi,t+1, which
depends on the pension system in force. The parameter β ∈ [0,1] repre-
sents the preference for future consumption for each type of individuals.
We assume that in the first period, when individuals make labor sup-
ply and saving decisions, the variables Rt+1 and wt are perfectly known
to consumers. Conversely, as it will be clear in Subsection 4.2.3, the de-
pendence of pi,t+1, on the decision variable li,t varies according to the
existing pension system.
12The choice of a quasilinear utility function imposes some restrictions since it implies
no income effects. The choice of a quadratic form of labor disutility is introduced to keep
the problem simple.
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Concluding, given the own specific productivity level hi , each indi-
vidual chooses li,t , si,t , ci,t , ci,t+1 to maximize his life-cycle utility under
the constraints in Eq. 4.1. The solutions to this optimization problem
are:
si,t =
β(1− τ)wthi li,t − βl
2
i,t
2 − pi,t+1Rt+1
1 + β
(4.2)
li,t = (1− τ)wthi +
∂pi,t+1
∂li,t
Rt+1
(4.3)
Notice that both the decisions for savings si,t and for labor supply li,t
depend on the pension system in force (e.g., through the terms pi,t+1 and
∂pi,t+1
∂li,t
, which will be discussed in detail in Subsection 4.2.3).
4.2.2 Production
Firms produce a single homogeneous good according to a Cobb-Douglas
technology exhibiting constant returns to scale. Therefore, the produc-
tion function F(K,L) is:
F(Kt ,Lt) = AK
α
t L
1−α
t (4.4)
where K is the aggregate capital stock, L is the aggregate labor input and
α ∈ (0,1).
Output and factor markets are competitive, which implies that firms
hire physical capital and labor until gross factor prices equal marginal
products:
wt = A(1−α)kαt (4.5)
Rt = (1 + rt) = Aαk
α−1
t (4.6)
where wt is the wage rate in period t.
The labor market clearing condition yields:
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Lt =Nt(λLhLlL,t +λHhH lH,t) (4.7)
We denote by kt =
Kt
Lt
the capital per efficiency unit, which we can
express as:
kt =
Kt
Lt
=
Kt
Nt(λLhLlL,t +λHhH lH,t)
(4.8)
Finally, we define the capital per worker as:
Kt
Nt
= kt(λLhLlL,t +λHhH lH,t) (4.9)
4.2.3 Pension Systems and Government Budget Constraint
We compare, in terms of labor market distortions and physical capital
accumulation, a PAYG NDC13 and a funded system that embodies an in-
tragenerational component, i.e. the MFF scheme.
Pay-as-you-go Notional Defined Contribution (PAYG NDC) System
In PAYG, pensions are paid out of contributions of current workers. There-
fore, since the State can directly tax the working population to finance
the pensions of the retired generation, there is no need to accumulate
assets in anticipation of future pension claims.
Consequently, the government budget constraint is balanced when
the following equality holds:
λLp
PAYG NDC
L,t+1 +λHp
PAYG NDC
H,t+1 =
τwPAYG NDCt+1
· (λLhLlPAYG NDCL,t+1 +λHhH lPAYG NDCH,t+1 )
· (1 + ρt+1)
(4.10)
Regarding the link between contributions and benefits, the key char-
acteristics of a PAYG NDC system are the payment of a pension whose
present value depends entirely on the individual’s contribution history,
13A preliminary version of the PAYG system appeared in Wen et al. (2015).
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and the application of an interest rate set by government rules. As a re-
sult, the pension payments rule for low skilled and high skilled workers
becomes:
pPAYG NDCL,t+1
pPAYG NDCH,t+1
=
hLl
PAYG NDC
L,t
hH l
PAYG NDC
H,t
(4.11)
Accordingly, combining Eqs. 4.10 and 4.11, the pension benefits for
a type i agent under this pension system are expressed as follows:
pPAYG NDCi,t+1 = τw
PAYG NDC
t hi l
PAYG NDC
i,t (1 + ρt+1)Ω
PAYG NDC
t+1 (4.12)
whereΩPAYG NDCt+1 denotes the growth factor of the economy’s per capita
income at time t + 1, which is defined as:
ΩPAYG NDCt+1 =
wPAYG NDCt+1 (λLhLl
PAYG NDC
L,t+1 +λHhH l
PAYG NDC
H,t+1 )
wPAYG NDCt (λLhLl
PAYG NDC
L,t+1 +λHhH l
PAYG NDC
H,t+1 )
(4.13)
Fully Funded (FF) and Modified Fully Funded (MFF) Systems
Differently from PAYG NDC, in FF pensions are paid out of a fund built
over a period of years from its members contributions. Contributions are
invested in financial or real assets, the return on which is credited to the
fund. The main feature of this funded system is that it does not allow
for redistribution across generations since the position of each cohort is
determined by its own past savings. Moreover, without any provision
for within-cohort redistribution, at retirement each individual obtains
no more than his first period savings and his past contributions, together
with the return yielded by the fund. Summing up, in a FF system, the
government’s budget is balanced when:
λLp
FF
L,t+1 +λHp
FF
H,t+1 = R
FF
t+1τw
FF
t (λLhLl
FF
L,t +λHhH l
FF
H,t) (4.14)
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Moreover, the pension payments rule for the low skilled and high
skilled workers is similar to Eq. 4.11, and is expressed as:
pFFL,t+1
pFFH,t+1
=
hLl
FF
L,t
hH l
FF
H,t
(4.15)
Accordingly, by combining Eqs. 4.14 and 4.15, the pension benefits
for a type i agent under this system are expressed as follows:
pFFi,t+1 = τw
FF
t hi l
FF
i,t R
FF
t+1 (4.16)
The absence of redistribution across individuals, and thus the dif-
ficulties in pursuing poverty relief during retirement, give us room for
proposing a modified version of the classical well-known FF system. The
refinement of the original version that we introduce has the purpose to
improve the living conditions for the low skilled retirees, who may not
save enough or accumulate enough in their fund for the retirement pe-
riod.
The Modified Fully Funded (MFF), works as the FF but in addition
disposes a lump-sum withdrawal b ∈ [0,1] from every individuals ac-
count before the beginning of the retirement period. The resources col-
lected in this way are invested in a parallel fund that is used for redistri-
bution once the same individuals become eligible for qualifying them-
selves as retirees.
Therefore, at the time of retirement every individual receives a pen-
sion which is made of two components:
pMFFi,t+1 = (1− b)pFFi,t+1 + bpRi,t+1 (4.17)
The first part of the pension obtained in the MFF system, namely
(1−b)pFFi,t+1, is the usual FF pension from which the withdrawal b is taken
away, while the second part, corresponding to bpRi,t+1, where R stands for
redistribution, represents the additional benefit given to every individ-
ual irrespective of the skill/income level, i.e. the benefit needed to carry
on intragenerational redistribution. Therefore, by definition, the redis-
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tributive component of pMFFi,t+1 obeys the rule
14:
pRL,t+1 = p
R
H,t+1 (4.18)
which simply remarks that the resources in the aforementioned par-
allel fund are spread equally among the whole population irrespective
of the belonging income class and thus irrespective of the contributions
one made when young.
Concluding, the two components of pMFFi,t+1 satisfy:
pFFi,t+1 = R
MFF
t+1 τw
MFF
t hi l
MFF
i,t (4.19)
and:
pRi,t+1 = R
MFF
t+1
∑
i=L,H
λiτw
MFF
t hi l
MFF
i,t (4.20)
4.3 General Equilibrium
The following definition introduces the general equilibrium given the
different social security systems.
Definition 1. Given the state of agents distribution in the economy and the
productivity levels of low skilled and high skilled individuals, a general equi-
librium is a sequence of individuals decisions, a sequence of factor prices, and
a sequence of pension payments so that:
1. Individuals choose li,t , si,t , ci,t , ci,t+1 to solve the maximization problem
described by Eq. 4.1, taking the factor prices as given;
2. Factor markets clearing condition holds: the factor prices are equal to
their marginal products, see Eqs. 4.5 and 4.6;
3. The government budget constraint is satisfied, i.e., Eqs. 4.12 and 4.13
are satisfied in the PAYG NDC system, while Eqs. 4.17-4.20 are satis-
fied in the MFF system.
14Notice that the other component of Eq. 4.17 satisfies Eq. 4.15. Clearly, when b = 0
there is no withdrawal and the system becomes a pure FF.
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In particular, in an unfunded system, the supply of capital in period
t+1 is determined by the saving decision of the young in period t. Hence,
physical capital KPAYG NDCt+1 in period t + 1 is the sum of the aggregate
previous period private savings:
KPAYG NDCt+1 =
∑
i=L,H
λiNts
PAYG NDC
i,t (4.21)
where si,t is provided by Eq. 4.2.
On the other hand, in a funded system, the aggregate physical capital
consists both of private and public savings of the former period. Accord-
ingly, the aggregate capital in the MFF case is:
KMFFt+1 =
∑
i=L,H
(λiNts
MFF
i,t +λiNtτw
MFF
t hi l
MFF
i,t ) (4.22)
4.3.1 General Equilibrium in the PAYG NDC System
We find the general equilibrium for the PAYG NDC system and summa-
rize the result in Preposition 1 (details of derivation are provided in the
Appendix B). In part 1 we derive the labor supply choice lPAYG NDCi,t of
both high and low skilled workers, which holds at any time t. In part 2
we express, for each time stage t, the just mentioned optimal labor sup-
ply as a function of the capital per efficiency unit kPAYG NDCt . In part 3,
we provide a recursive way to compute kPAYG NDCt+1 knowing k
PAYG NDC
t .
Finally, in part 4, we show that, when the population growth rate is con-
stant and equal to 1 + ρ, one obtains a unique nontrivial steady state
solution (i.e., one characterized by non-zero values of individual labor
supply choices, of capital per efficiency unit, and of capital per worker).
Preposition 1 [PAYG NDC]. The following holds for the general equi-
librium of the PAYG NDC system with a quasilinear specification of the
utility function.
1. Relationship between individual labor supply choice and capital
per efficiency unit:
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lPAYG NDCi,t =
[βτ(1−α) + 2α(1 + β) + τ(1−α)(2 + β)](1−α)(1− τ)Ahi
2α(1 + β) + τ(1−α)(2 + β)
· (kPAYG NDCt )α
(4.23)
2. Relationship between labor supply choices of high and low skilled
individuals:
lPAYG NDCH,t =
hH
hL
lPAYG NDCL,t (4.24)
3. Recursive formula for the capital per efficiency unit:
kPAYG NDCt+1 =[
Aαβ(1−α)(1− τ)
[2α(1 + β) + τ(1−α)(2 + β)](1 + ρt+1)
] 1
1+α
· (kPAYG NDCt )
2α
1+α
(4.25)
4. Unique nontrivial steady state solution (ρt = ρ for all t):
kPAYG NDC =
[
Aαβ(1−α)(1− τ)
[2α(1 + β) + τ(1−α)(2 + β)](1 + ρ)
] 1
1−α
(4.26)
lPAYG NDCi =
(1− τ)A(1−α)βτ(1−α) + 2α(1 + β) + τ(1−α)(2 + β)
2α(1 + β) + τ(1−α)(2 + β)
·
[
Aαβ(1−α)(1− τ)
[2α(1 + β) + τ(1−α)(2 + β)](1 + ρ)
] α
1−α
hi
(4.27)
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KPAYG NDCt
Nt
=
(λLh
2
L +λHh
2
H )(1− τ)A(1−α)
· βτ(1−α) + 2α(1 + β) + τ(1−α)(2 + β)
2α(1 + β) + τ(1−α)(2 + β)
·
[
Aαβ(1−α)(1− τ)
[2α(1 + β) + τ(1−α)(2 + β)](1 + ρ)
] 1+α
1−α
hi
(4.28)
4.3.2 General Equilibrium in the MFF System
Preposition 2 summarizes the general equilibrium in a MFF system (de-
tails of derivation are provided in the Appendix B). For this preposition,
one can make comments similar to those stated before Preposition 1.
Preposition 2 [MFF]. The following holds for the general equilibrium of
the MFF system with a quasilinear specification of the utility function.
1. Relationship between individual labor supply choice and capital
per efficiency unit:
lMFFi,t = (1− bτ(1−λi))A(1−α)hi(kMFFt )α (4.29)
2. Relationship between labor supply choices of high and low skilled
individuals:
lMFFH,t =
(1− bτλL)hH
(1− bτλH )hL l
MFF
L,t (4.30)
3. Recursive formula for the capital per efficiency unit:
kMFFt+1 =[
Aβ[λLh
2
L +λHh
2
H − b2τ2(λHh2L +λLh2H )λLλH ](1−α)
2(1 + β)(1 + ρt+1)[λLh
2
L +λHh
2
H ]− bτ(h2L + h2H )λLλH
] 1
1+α
·(kMFFt )
2α
1+α
(4.31)
4. Unique nontrivial steady state solution (ρt = ρ for all t):
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kMFF =[
Aβ[λLh
2
L +λHh
2
H − b2τ2(λHh2L +λLh2H )λLλH ](1−α)
2(1 + β)(1 + ρ)[λLh
2
L +λHh
2
H ]− bτ(h2L + h2H )λLλH
] 1
1−α (4.32)
lMFFi =
(1− bτ(1−λi))A(1−α)[
Aβ[λLh
2
L +λHh
2
H − b2τ2(λHh2L +λLh2H )λLλH ](1−α)
2(1 + β)(1 + ρ)[λLh
2
L +λHh
2
H ]− bτ(h2L + h2H )λLλH
] α
1−α
(4.33)
KMFFt
Nt
=
[λLh
2
L +λHh
2
H − bτλLλH (h2L + h2H )]A(1−α)[
Aβ[λLh
2
L +λHh
2
H − b2τ2(λHh2L +λLh2H )λLλH ](1−α)
2(1 + β)(1 + ρ)[λLh
2
L +λHh
2
H ]− bτ(h2L + h2H )λLλH
] 1+α
1−α
(4.34)
4.3.3 Main Findings
As we have just seen, Eq. 4.27 displays the agents steady state labour
supply under the unfunded NDC system. By assuming a dynamically
efficient economy, where the return on PAYG NDC is lower than the mar-
ket interest rate, high and low skilled workers tend to reduce the amount
of labor supplied since they realize the missed opportunity of investing
their contributions in stocks, bonds, or anything else. Conversely, Eq.
4.33 shows the agents steady state labor supply under the MFF system.
If we take a step back, and thus if we set the individual fund’s with-
drawal b equal to zero we have the original version of a funded system.
In a pure FF scheme, a variation in the contribution rate has no effect
on individual labor supply irrespective of whether the worker is high or
low skilled. This is a clear-cut result since in a pure FF individuals are
aware that the payment of contributions into their own account is simply
another form of private savings. Conversely, the introduction of a redis-
tributive component in the funded pension (b > 0) creates labor supply
distortions for both high and low skilled workers. In a MFF system, in
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fact, the former know that they will lose while the latter know that they
will gain with respect to the pure FF. By looking at Eq. 4.29, we can see
that the larger are the withdrawal b, the contribution rate τ , and the per-
centage of high skilled individuals in the population, the smaller is the
incentive to work of low skilled agents.15 Conversely, when the economy
is mainly composed of low skilled individuals, high levels of both b and
τ will create a disincentive to work for high skilled. Regarding the capi-
tal accumulation, which is expressed by Eqs. 4.26 and 4.32, we find that
in both PAYG NDC and pure FF (b = 0) the level of capital per efficiency
unit does not depend on the sizes of productive/less-productive groups.
Conversely, as it will be clearer in the next section, in a MFF system with
b , 0 the composition of the population matters since individuals adjust
their choices over consumption and saving according to the utility they
receive from redistribution.
Finally, both Propositions 1 and 2 support that the individual’s labor
supply at the steady state is higher in an aging economy (i.e., when 1 <
ρt+1 < 0) with respect to the case in which the population is increasing
from time t to time t + 1 (i.e., when ρt+1 > 0).
A deeper analysis of the changes in the individuals labor supply and
saving decision under both PAYG NDC and MFF is provided in Section
4.4, where we complete the steady state analysis with a numerical inves-
tigation for realistic values of the parameters.
4.4 Numerical Results
The following subsections, namely Subsections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2, show for
the different pension systems and for both high and low skilled workers,
the nontrivial steady state values of labor supply choice and capital accu-
mulation, expressed as functions of the parameter τ , for fixed values of
the other parameters α,β,A,hL,hH ,λL and ρ. Therefore, the equations we
have to focus on are Eqs. 4.23-4.34. In particular, we choose the values
15The higher is the withdrawal from each individual accounts, the higher is the weight of
the redistribution. For b = 1 we have a system where individuals receive the same benefit
no matter of their productivity type.
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α = 0.29 and A = 8 following Bouzahzah et al. (2002). Moreover, we set
β = 0.96, hL = 0.5, hH = 1, λL = 0.3, λL = 0.7 and ρ = 0.16 Additionally, in
Subsection 4.4.3 we investigate how the individual labor supply decision
reacts to changes in ρ when the contribution rate is equal to 0.1 and 0.4,
provided the other variables are set at the aforementioned values.
4.4.1 Labor Supply
In a dynamic efficient economy with a PAYG NDC system, irrespective
of the proportion of high and low skilled workers, an increase of the
contribution rate τ will always decrease the labor supply of both high
and low skilled workers (see Figure 8). Since the contributions paid by
individuals during the entire working career are used to finance pensions
of current period retirees, each workers claim for a pension is only based
on the promise that future generations will be responsible for providing
the benefit. Therefore, since the worker sees that the contributions he
is paying now are revaluated at a lower interest rate than the market
return, he will be more willing to supply less amount of labor.
In a pure FF system (b = 0), irrespective of the proportion of high and
low skilled workers in the economy, the labor supply of high and low
skilled workers is not related to the level of the contribution rate τ . The
worker is fully aware that the contribution that he is paying during the
working career is accumulated in a personal account to which he will
have access at the time of retirement.
In order to illustrate the MFF system we chose for simplicity a redis-
tribution component b equal to 0.3. From the graphs in Figure 8 it is
easy to see that when the proportion of high skilled individuals prevails,
i.e. when λL = 0.3 (blue dotted lines), while the labor supply distortion
for high skilled workers is the smallest, the labor supply distortion for
low skilled workers is the highest. When the composition of the popu-
lation is the one just mentioned, high skilled individuals realize that the
amount that they receive back with redistribution will not be much dif-
16We use λL = 0.3 to describe an economy mainly composed of high skilled workers.
Conversely, we use λL = 0.7 to represent an economy where the majority of people belongs
to the low skill class.
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Figure 8: Labor supply of high and low skilled workers
ferent from the fraction b that was previously taken from each individ-
ual account. For the same reason, low skilled workers are more inclined
to work less since they know, due to the presence of a majority of high
skilled individuals in the economy, that they will attain a higher than
expected pension from redistribution.
4.4.2 Capital Accumulation
In order to understand the behavior of the steady state capital per worker
Kt
Nt
, which is illustrated in Figure 9 (c), we firstly present separately in
Figure 9 (a) and (b) the capital per high skilled and low skilled individ-
uals, respectively.
By looking at Figure 9 (a) and (b) we see that in a PAYG NDC system,
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Figure 9: Capital Accumulation
when the contribution rate increases, it can be shown that the disposable
income in the first period decreases and so do the savings (both com-
ments follow from the equations presented in the Appendix B). There-
fore, irrespective of the proportion of high and low skilled workers in
the economy, both the capital per high skilled and low skilled worker
tends to decrease. Obviously, for a given level of τ , the level of capital
per worker for high skilled is higher than the one for low skilled.
Similarly, by looking at the first two graphs of Figure 9, we have that
in a pure FF, for both high and low skilled workers, as τ increases the dis-
posable income in the first period decreases and so do the savings. How-
ever, when the contribution rate increases, the resources accumulated in
each worker’s individual account rise. Overall, since the worker’s future
pension is generated by his personal first period savings and paid con-
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tribution, the capital per high and low skilled worker is independent on
the level of τ . Needless to say that, for a specific level of the tax rate, the
capital per worker for high skilled is higher than the one for low skilled.
In MFF, the analysis becomes more complex. In order to make the
discussion as clear as possible we present the behavior of high skilled
followed by the one of low skilled, i.e. we discuss Figure 9 (a) and then
Figure 9 (b).
For high skilled workers it can be shown from the formulas used to
prove Proposition 2 (see the Appendix B) that:
• First period savings are higher than in the case of pure FF (b = 0);
• First period savings are the highest when the proportion of low
skilled individual prevails, i.e. when λL = 0.7;
• The amount of resources invested in the individual account is lower
than in the pure FF (b = 0);
• The amount of resources invested in the individual account is the
lowest when the proportion of low skilled individual prevails, i.e.
when λL = 0.7.
Since high skilled workers know that a fraction b of their individual ac-
count will be withdrawn for redistribution purposes, as τ increases, they
will be more prone to increase their personal savings in the first period,
and to accumulate a lower amount of capital on their personal fund.17
Actually, by expanding the savings in the first period and by reducing
the accumulation of resources in their account, high skilled individu-
als preserve themselves from the large withdrawal associated to a richer
fund. In a world where low skilled individuals are the majority, if high
skilled individuals do not modify their choices on consumption and sav-
ings accordingly, as τ increases the amount that they get back once re-
distribution has occurred will be much lower than what they give in first
place.
17More precisely, the reduction of both periods consumption experienced in MFF by high
skilled workers is higher than in a pure FF case, and is the highest when the proportion of
low skilled individual prevails, i.e. when λL = 0.7.
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As can be seen from Figure 9 (a), as τ increases, in the MFF, the
choices of high skilled workers are distorted with respect to the pure
FF case: they save more and consume less. More precisely, the overall ef-
fect on the capital accumulation per high skilled worker is positive with
respect to the original FF system.
Conversely, for low skilled workers it can be shown that:
• First period savings are lower than in the case of pure FF (when
b = 0);
• First period savings are the lowest when the proportion of high
skilled individual prevails, i.e. when λL = 0.3;
• The amount of resources invested in the individual account is the
lowest when the proportion of high skilled individual prevails, i.e.
when λL = 0.3.
One can easily see that since low skilled individuals know that there will
be a redistribution, as τ increases, they will distort their choices over
savings and consumption in both periods.18 With respect to the pure
FF case, as τ increases, if the high skilled group is the largest one, in
addition to a reduction in the first period savings, low skilled workers
tend to reduce the capital accumulation in their account. Conversely,
when high skilled workers are the minority and τ rises, in addition to
the decrease of first period savings, low skilled workers are likely to in-
crease the resources accumulated in the personal fund (they know that
the gains obtained from the redistribution are not so high).
Therefore, from Figure 9 (b) we see that, as τ increases, the choices
of low skilled workers diverge from the pure FF case: they save less and
consume more. In particular, in a MFF scheme the overall effect on the
capital accumulation per low skilled worker is negative compared to the
original FF.
We can now move to the interpretation of Figure 9 (c). From the anal-
ysis conducted above, we have seen that while in a PAYG NDC a rise in
18It can be shown that in an MFF there is an increase of both periods consumption expe-
rienced by low skilled workers. Such increase is higher than in a pure FF, and is the highest
when the proportion of high skilled individual prevails, i.e. when λL = 0.3.
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the contribution rate τ depresses the level of capital per worker, in a pure
FF system, the same variation in τ has no effect on capital accumulation.
Conversely, in an MFF as τ increases, the rise in savings experienced by
high skilled workers prevails on the reduction of the same driven by the
behavior of low skilled individuals. Consequently, the introduction of a
redistributive component in a pure funded system induces an increase
in the accumulation of capital per worker (blue and red dotted lines are
above the solid ones).
As regards the behavior of capital per efficiency unit under PAYG
NDC, FF and MFF, we find the result reported in the following Figure
10.
Figure 10: Capital per efficiency unit
From Figure 10 we can infer that the capital per efficiency unit is the
highest when the pension system is a MFF and when the population is
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largely composed by low skilled workers.
By recalling Eq. 4.9 and the results presented in Figure 8 above, we
conclude that in the MFF scheme, provided the existence of a reduction
in the labor supply by both groups of individuals (high and low skilled
workers), labor supply contraction is higher when the proportion of low
skilled individuals prevails. More precisely, the negative impact that a
redistributive component has on the labor offer of high skilled workers
is as much higher as the fraction of low skilled workers in the economy.
Obviously, it follows that the lower the amount of labor supplied, the
higher is k.
4.4.3 What happens when ρ , 0?
In this subsection, we remove the assumption of a non-growing popu-
lation, i.e. we allow ρ to be different from zero. Keeping in mind the
negative effect on labor supply induced by the presence of a tax on la-
bor in both PAYG NDC and MFF, we now conduct a brief analysis on
the effect of an increase in the tax rate τ when the population is either
increasing either aging.
In Figure 11, we present the labor supply distortion suffered by high
skilled workers as a result of an increase in the tax rate τ when even ρ
is allowed to vary.19 Moreover, since a variation in the tax rate does not
affect the individual’s behavior in a pure FF system, we present the PAYG
NDC and the MFF cases only.
As one might expect, in a PAYG NDC system, irrespective on the pro-
portion of high and low skilled workers in the economy, when taxes are
higher, individuals are more willing to work less. Provided that, the
amount of labor supplied by the single individual is higher in an aging
economy. As ρ decreases in fact, the capital per efficiency unit increases
and so does the worker’s wage. From higher labor earnings, it follows a
higher incentive to work.
When analyzing the possible reduction in labor supply coming from
an increase in τ in a context where ρ is different from zero, we have
19The Appendix B shows that the behavior of low skilled workers is similar to the one of
high skilled individuals.
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to take into account that the composition of population matters. From
the previous subsection, in fact we notice that the distortion of labor
supply for high skilled workers is higher when the fraction of low skilled
individuals is the largest. Other than that, we can follow the reasoning
applied for the PAYG NDC case. Even in a MFF, as ρ decreases there exist
a higher incentive to work.
Figure 11: Labor supply distortion when ρ , 0
4.5 Conclusions
Aging population and declining fertility rates require reforms that could
help in creating more financially sustainable pension systems. The most
credited solution, which consists in the privatization of social security,
defined as the shift from unfunded Pay-as-you-go schemes to funded
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systems, does not come with disadvantages. In fact, while it allows over-
coming the solvency problems of unfunded schemes, it is not able to
pursue the relevant objectives of poverty relief and redistribution.
In a general equilibrium framework, this chapter studies labor mar-
ket distortions and capital accumulation arising in different social secu-
rity systems. Keeping in mind the solvency problem due to declining
fertility and rising longevity, we restrict the analysis on three pension
systems: the unfunded Pay-as-you-go Notional Defined Contribution,
the Fully Funded, and the no more actuarially fair Fully Funded system,
which is a modified funded scheme that includes an intragenerational re-
distributive component in order to carry on the redistribution purpose.
According to our results, while the unfunded scheme depresses labor
supply and physical capital accumulation, the original funded system
discourages neither of the two. Furthermore, in the modified version
of the funded system we propose, where the redistributive component
takes the form of a withdrawal from each individual account, while high
skilled workers consume less and increase their private savings in or-
der to own a scarce account, low skilled individuals, who know they
will gain from redistribution, increase consumption and reduce savings.
Overall, MFF slightly increases physical capital accumulation with re-
spect to the original funded system, without significantly reducing labor
supply incentives. From a broader perspective, the introduction of MFF
may help to reduce the burden of future intergenerational redistribu-
tion. Collecting and investing a share of each worker’s contribution in
a State-managed fund, and at the time of retirement redistributing such
resources equally among the corresponding population, help to create a
safety net for low-income pensioners contributing to alleviate the taxa-
tion burden on future cohorts of workers.
It is worthwhile to mention that, in order to reduce the distortionary
effect on labor supply arising when funded systems embody an intra-
generational redistributive component, it could be useful to introduce a
minimum number of hours worked or a minimum level of effort in order
for the individual to be eligible for redistribution.
Moreover, given the above discussion, even if the proposed MFF is
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able to reallocate resources among individuals, we are still in need of
ensuring people against investment risk. If assets in which resources are
invested perform poorly in fact, individuals face the risk of collecting
inadequate pension benefits. In particular, in order to provide insurance
against income uncertainty, the establishment of a proper regulation that
imposes a banner on risky investments becomes of relevant importance.
Actually, one can think, as it is happening in Chile, to create a Legal
System that allows governments to provide transfers (up to a limit) to
individuals who are not able to cover a minimum pension due, e.g., to
poor investments performance.
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Appendix B
B.1 Mathematical proofs
In this Appendix, we prove Propositions 1 and 2 in Subsections 4.3.1 and
4.3.2, deriving recursive formulas for the capital per efficiency unit for
the different pension systems, and relating the capital per efficiency unit
with individual labor supply choices. Starting from these recursive for-
mulas, we also provide expressions for the nontrivial steady state values
for the capital per efficiency unit, the individual labor supply choices,
and for the capital per worker.
Proof of Proposition 1 [PAYG NDC].
Using Eq. 4.13, one obtains:
ΩPAYG NDCt+1 =
wPAYG NDCt+1
(
λLhLl
PAYG NDC
L,t+1 +λHhH l
PAYG NDC
H,t+1
)
wPAYG NDCt
(
λLhLl
PAYG NDC
L,t +λHhH l
PAYG NDC
H,t
)
=
wPAYG NDCt+1 L
PAYG NDC
t+1
wPAYG NDCt (1 + ρt+1)L
PAYG NDC
t
.
(B.1)
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this, combined with Eqs. 4.5-4.6, provides:
ΩPAYG NDCt+1
RPAYG NDCt+1
=
wPAYG NDCt+1 L
PAYG NDC
t+1
wPAYG NDCt (1 + ρt+1)L
PAYG NDC
t R
PAYG NDC
t+1
=
A (1−α)
(
kPAYG NDCt+1
)α
LPAYG NDCt+1
wPAYG NDCt (1 + ρt+1)L
PAYG NDC
t Aα
(
kPAYG NDCt+1
)α−1
=
(1−α)LPAYG NDCt+1 kPAYG NDCt+1
wPAYG NDCt (1 + ρt+1)αL
PAYG NDC
t
.
(B.2)
Using Eqs. 4.3 and 4.12, one obtains:
lPAYG NDCi,t = (1− τ)wPAYG NDCt hi + τwPAYG NDCt hi (1 + ρt+1)
ΩPAYG NDCt+1
RPAYG NDCt+1
= (1− τ)wPAYG NDCt hi + τwPAYG NDCt hi (1 + ρt+1)
· (1−α)L
PAYG NDC
t+1 k
PAYG NDC
t+1
wPAYG NDCt (1 + ρt+1)αL
PAYG NDC
t
= (1− τ)wPAYG NDCt hi +
(1−α)τhiLPAYG NDCt+1 kPAYG NDCt+1
αLPAYG NDCt
= (1− τ)wPAYG NDCt hi +
(1−α)τhikPAYG NDCt+1
α
(1 + ρt+1)
· λLhLl
PAYG NDC
L,t+1 +λHhH l
PAYG NDC
H,t+1
λLhLl
PAYG NDC
L,t +λHhH l
PAYG NDC
H,t
.
(B.3)
hence, when i = L,H , respectively:
lPAYG NDCL,t = (1− τ)wPAYG NDCt hL +
(1−α)τhLkPAYG NDCt+1
α
(1 + ρt+1)
· λLhLl
PAYG NDC
L,t+1 +λHhH l
PAYG NDC
H,t+1
λLhLl
PAYG NDC
L,t +λHhH l
PAYG NDC
H,t
(B.4)
lPAYG NDCH,t = (1− τ)wPAYG NDCt hH +
(1−α)τhHkPAYG NDCt+1
α
(1 + ρt+1)
· λLhLl
PAYG NDC
L,t+1 +λHhH l
PAYG NDC
H,t+1
λLhLl
PAYG NDC
L,t +λHhH l
PAYG NDC
H,t
(B.5)
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Multiplying Eqs. B.4 and B.5 by hH and hL, respectively, and taking
the difference, one obtains:
lPAYG NDCL,t hH − lPAYG NDCH,t hL = 0 (B.6)
lPAYG NDCH,t =
hH
hL
lPAYG NDCL,t (B.7)
lPAYG NDCH,t+1 =
hH
hL
lPAYG NDCL,t+1 (B.8)
hence, Eq. B.4 simplifies to:
lPAYG NDCL,t = (1− τ)wPAYG NDCt hL +
(1−α)τhLkPAYG NDCt+1
α
(1 + ρt+1)
· λLhLl
PAYG NDC
L,t+1 +λHh
2
H /hLl
PAYG NDC
L,t+1
λLhLl
PAYG NDC
L,t +λHh
2
H /hLl
PAYG NDC
L,t
= (1− τ)wPAYG NDCt hL +
(1−α)τhLkPAYG NDCt+1
α
· (1 + ρt+1)
lPAYG NDCL,t+1
lPAYG NDCL,t
= (1−α) (1− τ)AhL
(
kPAYG NDCt
)α
+
(1−α)τhLkPAYG NDCt+1
α
· (1 + ρt+1)
lPAYG NDCL,t+1
lPAYG NDCL,t
(B.9)
Multiplying the two sides of Eq. B.9 by lPAYG NDCL,t :(
lPAYG NDCL,t
)2 − (1−α) (1− τ)AhL(kPAYG NDCt )αlPAYG NDCL,t
− (1−α)τhLk
PAYG NDC
t+1
α
(1 + ρt+1) l
PAYG NDC
L,t+1 = 0.
(B.10)
this is a second-order algebraic equation with discriminant ∆ ≥ 0, whose
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only non-negative solution is:
lPAYG NDCL,t =
(1−α) (1− τ)AhL
(
kPAYG NDCt
)α
2
+
√
(1−α)2(1− τ)2A2h2L
(
kPAYG NDCt
)2α
+ 4τ(1−α)(1+ρt+1)hLα k
PAYG NDC
t+1 l
PAYG NDC
L,t+1
2
.
(B.11)
In the following, we also determine another recurrence satisfied by
the capital in efficiency units. To this aim, first we have to find expres-
sions for the savings sPAYG NDCi,t . Using Eqs. B.2 and B.7, we can simplify
the expression of Ω
PAYG NDC
t+1
RPAYG NDCt+1
and determine the expression of
pPAYG NDCi,t+1
RPAYG NDCt+1
as follows.
ΩPAYG NDCt+1
RPAYG NDCt+1
=
wPAYG NDCt+1
(
λLhLl
PAYG NDC
L,t+1 +λHhH l
PAYG NDC
H,t+1
)
wPAYG NDCt
(
λLhLl
PAYG NDC
L,t +λHhH l
PAYG NDC
H,t
)
Aα
(
kPAYG NDCt+1
)α−1
=
wPAYG NDCt+1 l
PAYG NDC
L,t+1
wPAYG NDCt l
PAYG NDC
L,t Aα
(
kPAYG NDCt+1
)α−1
=
A (1−α)
(
kPAYG NDCt+1
)α
lPAYG NDCL,t+1
A (1−α)
(
kPAYG NDCt
)α
lPAYG NDCL,t Aα
(
kPAYG NDCt+1
)α−1
=
kPAYG NDCt+1 l
PAYG NDC
L,t+1
Aα
(
kPAYG NDCt
)α
lPAYG NDCL,t
.
(B.12)
pPAYG NDCi,t+1
RPAYG NDCt+1
= τwPAYG NDCt (1 + ρt+1)hi li,t
ΩPAYG NDCt+1
RPAYG NDCt+1
= τwPAYG NDCt (1 + ρt+1)hi li,t
kPAYG NDCt+1 l
PAYG NDC
L,t+1
Aα
(
kPAYG NDCt
)α
lPAYG NDCL,t
= τA (1−α)
(
kPAYG NDCt
)α
(1 + ρt+1)hi li,t
kPAYG NDCt+1 l
PAYG NDC
L,t+1
Aα
(
kPAYG NDCt
)α
lPAYG NDCL,t
= τ (1−α) (1 + ρt+1)hi li,t
kPAYG NDCt+1 l
PAYG NDC
L,t+1
αlPAYG NDCL,t
.
(B.13)
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hence, using Eqs. 4.2, B.7, and B.9, one gets the following expressions
for sPAYG NDCL,t and s
PAYG NDC
H,t :
sPAYG NDCL,t =
β(1− τ)2A2(1−α)2
(
kPAYG NDCt
)2α
h2L
1 + β
+
β (1− τ)A(1−α)2
(
kPAYG NDCt
)α
h2Lτ
(1 + β)
kPAYG NDCt+1
α
(1 + ρt+1)
· l
PAYG NDC
L,t+1
lPAYG NDCL,t
− β
(1− τ)2A2(1−α)2
(
kPAYG NDCt
)2α
h2L
2(1 + β)
− β
2(1 + β)
·
(1−α)2τ2h2L
(
kPAYG NDCt+1
)2
α2
(1 + ρt+1)
2
 lPAYG NDCL,t+1
lPAYG NDCL,t
2
− β
(1− τ)A(1−α)2
(
kPAYG NDCt
)α
h2Lτ
(1 + β)
kPAYG NDCt+1
α
(1 + ρt+1)
· l
PAYG NDC
L,t+1
lPAYG NDCL,t
− τ (1−α) (1 + ρt+1)hLl
PAYG NDC
L,t
1 + β
kPAYG NDCt+1
α
lPAYG NDCL,t+1
lPAYG NDCL,t
=
β(1− τ)2A2(1−α)2
(
kPAYG NDCt
)2α
h2L
2(1 + β)
− β
2(1 + β)
·
(1−α)2τ2h2L
(
kPAYG NDCt+1
)2
α2
(1 + ρt+1)
2
 lPAYG NDCL,t+1
lPAYG NDCL,t
2
− τ (1−α) (1 + ρt+1)hLl
PAYG NDC
L,t
1 + β
kPAYG NDCt+1
α
lPAYG NDCL,t+1
lPAYG NDCL,t
(B.14)
sPAYG NDCH,t =
β(1− τ)2A2(1−α)2
(
kPAYG NDCt
)2α
h2H
2(1 + β)
− β
2(1 + β)
·
(1−α)2τ2h2H
(
kPAYG NDCt+1
)2
α2
(1 + ρt+1)
2
 lPAYG NDCL,t+1
lPAYG NDCL,t
2
− τ (1−α) (1 + ρt+1)h
2
H l
PAYG NDC
L,t
hL (1 + β)
kPAYG NDCt+1
α
lPAYG NDCL,t+1
lPAYG NDCL,t
.
(B.15)
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Combining Eqs. B.14 and B.15, one gets:
KPAYG NDCt+1 =
∑
i=L,H
Ntλis
PAYG NDC
i,t
=
Nt
1 + β
[
β(1− τ)2A2(1−α)2
(
kPAYG NDCt
)2α λLh2L +λHh2H
2
− β
2
(1−α)2τ2
(
kPAYG NDCt+1
)2
α2
(1 + ρt+1)
2
 lPAYG NDCL,t+1
lPAYG NDCL,t
2 (λLh2L +λHh2H )
− τ (1−α) (1 + ρt+1)
kPAYG NDCt+1
α
lPAYG NDCL,t+1
λLh
2
L +λHh
2
H
hL
]
.
(B.16)
then, one obtains:
LPAYG NDCt+1 =Nt+1
(
λLhLl
PAYG NDC
L,t+1 +λHhH l
PAYG NDC
H,t+1
)
=Nt (1 + ρt+1)
λLh
2
L +λHh
2
H
hL
lPAYG NDCL,t+1
(B.17)
kPAYG NDCt+1 =
KPAYG NDCt+1
LPAYG NDCt+1
=
1
2(1 + β) (1 + ρt+1) l
PAYG NDC
L,t+1
[
A2β (1−α)2(1− τ)2hL
·
(
kPAYG NDCt
)2α − βτ2 (1−α)2(1 + ρt+1)2hL
α2
 lPAYG NDCL,t+1
lPAYG NDCL,t
2
·
(
k PAYG NDCt+1
)2 − 2τ (1−α) (1 + ρt+1)kPAYG NDCt+1
α
lPAYG NDCL,t+1
]
.
(B.18)
In the following, we also show how one can express kPAYG NDCt+1 as a
function of kPAYG NDCt . Starting from Eq. B.10, one gets:
lPAYG NDCL,t+1 =
lPAYG NDCL,t
(
lPAYG NDCL,t − (1−α) (1− τ)AhL
(
kPAYG NDCt
)α )
(1−α)τhLkPAYG NDCt+1
α (1 + ρt+1)
(B.19)
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which requires:
lPAYG NDCL,t ≥ (1−α) (1− τ)AhL
(
kPAYG NDCt
)α
(B.20)
to guarantee the non-negativity of lPAYG NDCL,t+1 . Then, using also Eq. B.18,
one obtains:
2(1 + β) (1 + ρt+1)k
PAYG NDC
t+1
· l
PAYG NDC
L,t
(
lPAYG NDCL,t − (1−α) (1− τ)AhL
(
kPAYG NDCt
)α )
(1−α)τhLkPAYG NDCt+1
α (1 + ρt+1)
= A2β (1−α)2(1− τ)2hL
(
kPAYG NDCt
)2α − βτ2 (1−α)2(1 + ρt+1)2hL
α2
(lPAYG NDCL,t )
2 (
lPAYG NDCL,t −(1−α)(1−τ)AhL(kPAYG NDCt )
α )2
(1−α)2τ2h2L(kPAYG NDCt+1 )
2
α2
(1+ρt+1)
2(
l PAYG NDCL,t
)2 (kPAYG NDCt+1 )2
− 2τ (1−α) (1 + ρt+1)k
PAYG NDC
t+1
α
· l
PAYG NDC
L,t
(
lPAYG NDCL,t − (1−α) (1− τ)AhL
(
kPAYG NDCt
)α )
(1−α)τhLkPAYG NDCt+1
α (1 + ρt+1)
,
(B.21)
hence,
2α (1 + β) lPAYG NDCL,t
(
lPAYG NDCL,t − (1−α) (1− τ)AhL
(
kPAYG NDCt
)α)
(1−α)τhL
= A2β(1−α)2(1− τ)2hL
(
k PAYG NDCt
)2α
− β
(
lPAYG NDCL,t − (1−α) (1− τ)AhL
(
kPAYG NDCt
)α)2
hL
− 2 l
PAYG NDC
L,t
(
lPAYG NDCL,t − (1−α) (1− τ)AhL
(
kPAYG NDCt
)α)
hL
.
(B.22)
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After some simplifications, B.22 reduces to:
2α (1 + β) + τ (1−α) (2 + β)
(1−α)τ
= β
(1−α) (1− τ)AhL
(
kPAYG NDCt
)α
lPAYG NDCL,t − (1−α) (1− τ)AhL
(
k PAYG NDCt
)α . (B.23)
Concluding, one can express lPAYG NDCL,t as a function of k
PAYG NDC
t
as follows:
lPAYG NDCL,t =
[βτ (1−α) + 2α (1 + β) + τ (1−α) (2 + β)] (1−α) (1− τ)A hL
2α (1 + β) + τ (1−α) (2 + β)
·
(
kPAYG NDCt
)α (B.24)
which also satisfies Eq. B.20. Then, using Eq. B.7, one obtains:
lPAYG NDCH,t =
[βτ (1−α) + 2α (1 + β) + τ (1−α) (2 + β)] (1−α) (1− τ)A hH
2α (1 + β) + τ (1−α) (2 + β)
·
(
k PAYG NDCt
)α
.
(B.25)
From Eq. B.24, one gets:
lPAYG NDCL,t+1
lPAYG NDCL,t
=
(
kPAYG NDCt+1
)α(
kPAYG NDCt
)α (B.26)
which combined with B.9 and B.24, provides:
[βτ (1−α) + 2α (1 + β) + τ (1−α) (2 + β)] (1−α) (1− τ)A hL
2α (1 + β) + τ (1−α) (2 + β)
(
kPAYG NDCt
)α
= (1−α) (1− τ)AhL
(
k PAYG NDCt
)α
+
(1−α)τhLkPAYG NDCt+1
α
· (1 + ρt+1)
(
k PAYG NDCt+1
)α(
kPAYG NDCt
)α .
(B.27)
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Then, after some simplifications, one obtains:
kPAYG NDCt+1 =
[
Aαβ (1−α) (1− τ)
[2α (1 + β) + τ (1−α) (2 + β)(1 + ρt+1)
] 1
1+α (
kPAYG NDCt
) 2α
1+α ,
(B.28)
which is the desired recursive formula.
When ρt = ρ for all t, the steady state expression of the capital in ef-
ficiency units is trivially obtained equating k PAYG NDCt+1 and k
PAYG NDC
t ,
whereas the steady state expressions for the individual labor supply choices
and for the capital per person are obtained using B.24, B.7, and 4.9.
Summarizing the analysis above, for the PAYG NDC case one obtains
the following.
Relationship between the individual labor supply choices and the capital
per efficiency unit:
lPAYG NDCi,t =
[βτ (1−α) + 2α (1 + β) + τ (1−α) (2 + β)] (1−α) (1− τ)A hi
2α (1 + β) + τ (1−α) (2 + β)
·
(
kPAYG NDCt
)α (B.29)
Relationship between the labor supply choices of both high and low skilled
workers:
lPAYG NDCH,t =
hH
hL
lPAYG NDCL,t . (B.30)
Recursive formula for the capital per efficiency unit:
kPAYG NDCt+1 =
[
Aαβ (1−α) (1− τ)
[2α (1 + β) + τ (1−α) (2 + β)](1 + ρt+1)
] 1
1+α (
kPAYG NDCt
) 2α
1+α .
(B.31)
Unique nontrivial steady state solution (when ρt = ρ for all t):
kPAYG NDC =
[
Aαβ (1−α) (1− τ)
[2α (1 + β) + τ (1−α) (2 + β)](1 + ρ)
] 1
1−α
(B.32)
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lPAYG NDCi = (1− τ)A (1−α)
βτ (1−α) + 2α (1 + β) + τ (1−α) (2 + β)
2α (1 + β) + τ (1−α) (2 + β)
·
[
Aαβ (1−α) (1− τ)
[2α (1 + β) + τ (1−α) (2 + β)](1 + ρ)
] α
1−α
(B.33)
KPAYG NDCt
Nt
= (λLh
2
L +λHh
2
H ) (1− τ)A (1−α)
· βτ (1−α) + 2α (1 + β) + τ (1−α) (2 + β)
2α (1 + β) + τ (1−α) (2 + β)
·
[
Aαβ (1−α) (1− τ)
[2α (1 + β) + τ (1−α) (2 + β)](1 + ρ)
] 1+α
1−α
.
(B.34)
Proof of Proposition 2 [MFF].
For simplicity, we start reporting the steps required for the case λL =
λH =
1
2 . Combining Eqs. 4.3 and 4.17-4.20, one obtains:
lMFFi,t = (1− τ)wMFFt hi +
RMFFt+1
(
(1− b)τwMFFt hi + bτw
MFF
t hi
2
)
RMFFt+1
=
[
(1− τ) + τ
(
1− b
2
)]
wMFFt hi
=
(
1− bτ
2
)
wMFFt hi ,
(B.35)
which implies:
lMFFH,t =
hH
hL
lMFFL,t . (B.36)
Now, using Eq. B.35, we notice that:
(1− b)τwMFFt hLlMFFL,t +
∑
i=L,H
bτwMFFt hi l
MFF
i,t
2
=
(
1− b
2
)
τwMFFt hL
(
1− bτ
2
)
wMFFt hL +
b
2
τwMFFt hH
(
1− bτ
2
)
wMFFt hH
= τ
[(
1− b
2
)
h2L +
b
2
h2H
](
1− bτ
2
)(
wMFFt
)2
,
(B.37)
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and similarly,
(1− b)τwMFFt hH lMFFH,t +
∑
i=L,H
bτwMFFt hi l
MFF
i,t
2
= τ
[(
1− b
2
)
h2H +
b
2
h2L
](
1− bτ
2
)(
wMFFt
)2
.
(B.38)
These, combined with Eqs. 4.2 and 4.3, provide:
sMFFL,t =
β (1− τ)wMFFt hLlMFFL,t −
β(lMFFL,t )
2
2 −
pMFFL,t+1
RMFFt+1
1 + β
=
β (1− τ)
(
1− bτ2
)(
wMFFt
)2
h2L
1 + β
− β
(
1− bτ2
)2(
wMFFt
)2
h2L
2(1 + β)
− τ
(
1− b2
)(
1− bτ2
)(
wMFFt
)2
h2L
1 + β
− τ
b
2
(
1− bτ2
)(
wMFFt
)2
h2H
1 + β
=
1− bτ2
1 + β
[(
2β + bτ (2 + β)
4
− τ (1 + β)
)
h2L −
bτ
2
h2H
] (
wMFFt
)2
(B.39)
and
sMFFH,t =
1− bτ2
1 + β
[(
2β + bτ (2 + β)
4
− τ (1 + β)
)
h2H −
bτ
2
h2L
] (
wMFFt
)2
. (B.40)
Then, using Eq. 4.22, and equations above, one gets:
KMFFt+1 =
Nt
2
∑
i=L,H
(sMFFi,t + (1− b)τwMFFt hi lMFFi,t + bτwMFFt hi lMFFi,t )
=
[ (2 + bτ)β
4
− τ(1 + β)
]Nt(1− bτ2 )
2(1 + β)
(h2L + h
2
H ) (w
MFF
t )
2
+ τ(1− b)Nt(1−
bτ
2 )
2(1 + β)
(h2L + h
2
H )(w
MFF
t )
2
+ bτ
Nt(1− bτ2 )
2(1 + β)
(h2L + h
2
H )(w
MFF
t )
2
=
Ntβ(1− bτ2 )(1 + bτ2 )
4(1 + β)
h2L + h
2
H )(w
MFF
t )
2
,
(B.41)
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LMFFt+1 =
Nt+1
2
(
1− bτ
2
)
wMFFt+1
(
h2L + h
2
H
)
, (B.42)
kMFFt+1 =
KMFFt+1
LMFFt+1
=
Ntβ(1− bτ2 )(1+ bτ2 )
4(1+β)
(
h2L + h
2
H
) (
wMFFt
)2
Nt+1
2
(
1− bτ2
)
wMFFt+1
(
h2L + h
2
H
)
=
Ntβ
(
1 + bτ2
)(
wMFFt
)2
2(1 + β) (1 + ρt+1)w
MFF
t+1
=
β
(
1 + bτ2
)
A2(1−α)2
(
kMFFt
)2α
2(1 + β) (1 + ρt+1)A (1−α)
(
kMFFt+1
)α
=
β
(
1 + bτ2
)
A (1−α)
(
kMFFt
)2α
2(1 + β) (1 + ρt+1)
(
kMFFt+1
)α ,
(B.43)
which is the desired recursive formula.
When ρt = ρ for all t, the steady state expression for the capital per
efficiency unit is trivially obtained equating kMFFt+1 and k
MFF
t , whereas the
steady state expressions for the individual labor supply choices and for
the capital per worker are obtained using B.35, 4.5, and 4.9.
Summarizing the analysis above, for the MFF case with λL = λH =
1
2
one obtains the following:
Relationship between the individual labor supply choices and the capital
per efficiency unit:
lMFFi,t =
(
1− bτ
2
)
A(1−α)hi
(
kMFFt
)α
. (B.44)
Relationship between the labor supply choices of both high and low skilled
workers:
lMFFH,t =
hH
hL
lMFFL,t . (B.45)
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Recursive formula for the capital per efficiency unit:
kMFFt+1 =
Aβ
(
1 + bτ2
)
(1−α)
2(1 + β) (1 + ρt+1)

1
1+α (
kMFFt
) 2α
1+α . (B.46)
Unique nontrivial steady state solution (when ρt = ρ for all t):
kMFF =
Aβ
(
1 + bτ2
)
(1−α)
2(1 + β) (1 + ρ)

1
1−α
. (B.47)
lMFFi =
(
1− bτ
2
)
A(1−α)
A
(
1 + bτ2
)
β (1−α)
2(1 + β) (1 + ρ)

α
1−α
(B.48)
KMFFt
Nt
=
(
1− bτ
2
)
h2L + h
2
H
2
A(1−α)
A
(
1 + bτ2
)
β (1−α)
2(1 + β) (1 + ρ)

1+α
1−α
. (B.49)
In the general case λL , λH , 12 , the formulas above are modified as
follows:
lMFFi,t = (1− bτ(1−λi))hi . (B.50)
lMFFH,t =
(1− bτλL)hH
(1− bτλH )hL l
MFF
L,t . (B.51)
KMFFt+1 =
Nt[λLh
2
L +λHh
2
H − b2τ2(λLh2L +λHh2H )λLλH ]
2(1 + β) [λLh
2
L +λHh
2
H − bτ(h2L + h2H )λLλH ]
·λLh2L +λHh2H − bτλLλH
(
h2L + h
2
H
)(
wMFFt+1
)2
,
(B.52)
LMFFt+1 =Nt+1
[
λLh
2
L +λHh
2
H − bτλLλH
(
h2L + h
2
H
)]
wMFFt+1 . (B.53)
Summarizing, for the MFF case with λL , λH , 12 one obtains the
following.
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Relationship between the individual labor supply choices and the capital
per efficiency unit:
lMFFi,t = (1− bτ (1−λi))A(1−α)hi
(
kMFFt
)α
. (B.54)
Relationship between the labor supply choices of both high and low skilled
workers:
lMFFH,t =
(1− bτλL)hH
(1− bτλH )hL l
MFF
L,t . (B.55)
Recursive formula for the capital per efficiency unit:
kMFFt+1 =
[
Aβ[λLh
2
L +λHh
2
H − b2τ2(λHh2L +λLh2H )λLλH ] (1−α)
2(1 + β) (1 + ρt+1) [λLh
2
L +λHh
2
H − bτ(h2L + h2H )λLλH ]
] 1
1+α
·
(
kMFFt
) 2α
1+α .
(B.56)
Unique nontrivial steady state solution (when ρt = ρ for all t):
kMFF =
[
Aβ[λLh
2
L +λHh
2
H − b2τ2(λHh2L +λLh2H )λLλH ] (1−α)
2(1 + β) (1 + ρ) [λLh
2
L +λHh
2
H − bτ(h2L + h2H )λLλH ]
] 1
1−α
. (B.57)
lMFFi = (1− bτ(1−λi))A(1−α)
·
[Aβ[λLh2L +λHh2H − b2τ2(λHh2L +λLh2H )λLλH ] (1−α)
2(1 + β) (1 + ρ) [λLh
2
L +λHh
2
H − bτ(h2L + h2H )λLλH ]
] α
1−α
hi .
(B.58)
KMFFt
Nt
= [λLh
2
L +λHh
2
H − bτλLλH (h2L + h2H )]A(1−α)
·
[Aβ[λLh2L +λHh2H − b2τ2(λHh2L +λLh2H )λLλH ] (1−α)
2(1 + β) (1 + ρ) [λLh
2
L +λHh
2
H − bτ(h2L + h2H )λLλH ]
] α
1−α
hi .
(B.59)
102
References
Aaron, H. (1966). The social insurance paradox. Canadian Journal of Eco-
nomics and Political Science/Revue canadienne de economiques et science politique,
32(03):371–374. 3, 64
Auerbach, A. J., Gokhale, J., and Kotlikoff, L. J. (1991). Generational accounts-a
meaningful alternative to deficit accounting. Technical report, National Bu-
reau of Economic Research. 3, 10, 20
Auerbach, A. J., Gokhale, J., and Kotlikoff, L. J. (1992). Social security and medi-
care policy from the perspective of generational accounting. In Tax Policy and
the Economy, Volume 6, pages 129–145. The MIT Press. 10, 20
Auerbach, A. J., Gokhale, J., and Kotlikoff, L. J. (1994). Generational accounting:
a meaningful way to evaluate fiscal policy. The Journal of Economic Perspectives,
8(1):73–94. 3, 10, 20
Auerbach, A. J. and Oreopoulos, P. (2000). The fiscal effects of us immigration:
a generational-accounting perspective. In Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume
14, pages 123–156. MIT Press. 10
Banca dItalia (2014). I bilanci delle famiglie italiane dell anno 2014. 27
Barr, N. and Diamond, P. (2006). The economics of pensions. Oxford review of
economic policy, 22(1):15–39. 65
Benz, U. and Fetzer, S. (2006). Indicators for measuring fiscal sustainability: a
comparison of the oecd method and generational accounting. FinanzArchiv:
Public Finance Analysis, 62(3):367–391. 20, 23
Biffi, P. and Clemente, G. P. (2014). Selecting stochastic mortality models for the
italian population. Decisions in Economics and Finance, 37(2):255–286. 58
Bisetti, E. and Favero, C. A. (2014). Measuring the impact of longevity risk on
pension systems: The case of italy. North American Actuarial Journal, 18(1):87–
103. 47
103
Blake, D. (2006). Pension economics. John Wiley & Sons. 65
Blake, D., Boardman, T., and Cairns, A. (2014). Sharing longevity risk: Why
governments should issue longevity bonds. North American Actuarial Journal,
18(1):258–277. 62
Blake, D. and Burrows, W. (2001). Survivor bonds: Helping to hedge mortality
risk. Journal of Risk and Insurance, pages 339–348. 62
Blanchard, O. J., Chouraqui, J.-C., Hagemann, R., and Sartor, N. (1991). The
sustainability of fiscal policy: New answers to an old question. NBER Working
Paper, (R1547). 10
Bonin, H. (2013). Generational accounting: theory and application. Springer Sci-
ence & Business Media. 10, 20, 28
Bonin, H., Raffelhu¨schen, B., and Walliser, J. (2000). Can immigration alleviate
the demographic burden? FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, 57(1):1–21.
10
Booth, H. and Tickle, L. (2008). Mortality modelling and forecasting: A review
of methods. Annals of actuarial science, 3(1-2):3–43. 46
Borjas, G. J. (1994). The economics of immigration. Journal of economic literature,
32(4):1667–1717. 10
Borjas, G. J. and Bratsberg, B. (1994). Who leaves? the outmigration of the
foreign-born. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research. 29
Bouzahzah, M., De la Croix, D., and Docquier, F. (2002). Policy reforms and
growth in computable olg economies. Journal of economic dynamics and control,
26(12):2093–2113. 79
Breyer, F. and Straub, M. (1993). Welfare effects of unfunded pension systems
when labor supply is endogenous. Journal of Public Economics, 50(1):77–91. 67
Cairns, A. J., Blake, D., and Dowd, K. (2006). A two-factor model for stochastic
mortality with parameter uncertainty: Theory and calibration. Journal of Risk
and Insurance, 73(4):687–718. 48, 58
Cardarelli, R. and Sartor, N. (2000). Generational accounting for italy. In Fiscal
Sustainability Conference, page 501. 10
CNEL and MPLS (2012). CNEL - Consiglio Nazionale Economia e Lavoro e MPLS
- Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali: Il ruolo degli immigrati nel
mercato del lavoro italiano. 13
104
Coda Moscarola, F. (2001). The effects of immigration inflows on the sustainabil-
ity of the italian welfare states. 10
Diamond, P. A. (1965). National debt in a neoclassical growth model. The Amer-
ican Economic Review, 55(5):1126–1150. 66, 67
Disney, R. (1996). Can we afford to grow older?: a perspective on the economics of
aging. Mit Press. 65
Disney, R. et al. (1999). Notional accounts as a pension reform strategy: An evalua-
tion. Social Protection, World Bank. 4, 64
Dustmann, C. (1996). Return migration: the european experience. Economic
policy, 11(22):213–250. 29
Dustmann, C. (2003). Return migration, wage differentials, and the optimal mi-
gration duration. European Economic Review, 47(2):353–369. 29
EC (2015a). EC - European Commission: The 2015 Aging Report - economic
and budgetary projections for the 28 EU Member States (2013-2060). http:
//ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/. 2, 4, 25, 26, 27, 28, 34,
35, 47
EC (2015b). EC - European Commission: The 2015 Aging Report - Under-
lying Assumptions and Projection Methodologies. http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/publications/. 28
EC (2016). EC - European Commission: 2015 Fiscal sustainability report. http:
//ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/. 1, 3, 4
EMN (2014). EMN - European Migration Network: Migrant access to social se-
curity and healthcare in italy, policies and practices. 14, 19
Eurostat (2013). Population projections europop2013. http://ec.europa.eu/
eurostat/data/database. 28, 34, 47
Eurostat (2016a). Annual government finance statistics database - year 2013.
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database. 25, 26
Eurostat (2016b). Education and training database - year 2013. http://ec.
europa.eu/eurostat/data/database. 27
Fetzer, S. (2006). Zur nachhaltigen Finanzierung des gesetzlichen Gesundheitssys-
tems. Lang. 20
Fondazione Leone Moressa (2014). Rapporto Annuale sull Economia dellImmi-
grazione La forza lavoro degli stranieri: esclusione o integrazione? Il Mulino. 13,
15
105
Fornero, E. and Castellino, O. (2001). La riforma del sistema previdenziale ital-
iano. Il Mulino, Bologna. 17
Franco, D., Gokhale, J., Guiso, L., Kotlikoff, L. J., Sartor, N., et al. (1992). Gener-
ational accounting: the case of Italy. Citeseer. 10
Hagist, C. (2008). Demography and Social Health Insurance. Nomos Verlagsge-
sellschaft mbH & Co. KG. 20, 31
Hagist, C., Moog, S., Raffelhu¨schen, B., Vatter, J., et al. (2009). Public debt
and demography-an international comparison using generational accounting.
Technical report. 10
Hagist, C., Raffelhu¨schen, B., Risa, A. E., Vardal, E., et al. (2011). Long-term fiscal
effects of public pension reform in norway: A generational accounting analy-
sis. Research Center for Generational Contracts, University of Freiburg, Discussion
Paper, (49):36. 20
HMD (2015). HMD - Human Mortality Database. http://http://www.
mortality.org. 46, 48, 50, 52, 53
Holzmann, R., Koettl, J., Chernetsky, T., et al. (2005). Portability regimes of pension
and health care benefits for international migrants: an analysis of issues and good
practices, volume 23. Global Commission on International Migration Geneva,
Switzerland. 20
Holzmann, R., Palmer, E. E., et al. (2006). Pension reform: Issues and prospects for
non-financial defined contribution (NDC) schemes. World Bank Publications. 4,
64
IDOS (2015). IDOS - Centro Studi e Richerche: Dossier Statistico Immigrazione
2015. Edizioni IDOS. 12, 13, 14, 15
Ignacio Conde-Ruiz, J. and Profeta, P. (2007). The redistributive design of social
security systems. The Economic Journal, 117(520):686–712. 65
IMF (2012). IMF - International Monetary Fund: global financial stability report.
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2012/01/pdf/text.pdf. 3,
46, 62
INPS (2014). INPS - Istituto Nazionale per la Previdenza Sociale: Osservatori
statistici sugli extracomunitari e sui comunitari nati nei paesi dell’Europa
dell’Est. Retribuzione dei lavoratori dipendenti. 15, 16, 27
INPS (2015). INPS - Istituto Nazionale per la Previdenza Sociale: L’INPS e le
pensioni all’estero: un fenomeno in continua evoluzione. 19, 20
106
ISTAT (1998). ISTAT - Istituto Nazionale di Statistica: La presenza straniera in
Italia negli anni 90. 11
ISTAT (2001). ISTAT - Istituto Nazionale di Statistica: 14 Censimento generale
della popolazione e delle abitazioni. 12
ISTAT (2011). ISTAT - Istituto Nazionale di Statistica: 15 Censimento generale
della popolazione e delle abitazioni. 12
ISTAT (2014a). ISTAT - Istituto Nazionale di Statistica: Condizioni di salute,
fattori di rischio e ricorso ai servizi sanitari Anno 2013. 27
ISTAT (2014b). ISTAT - Istituto Nazionale di Statistica: Conti ed aggregati eco-
nomici delle Amministrazioni Pubbliche anni 1995-2012. 25, 26
ISTAT (2014c). ISTAT - Istituto Nazionale di Statistica: I beneficiari delle
prestazioni pensionistiche Anno 2011. 26
ISTAT (2015). ISTAT - Istituto Nazionale di Statistica: Rilevazione sulle forze di
lavoro, IV Trimestre 2014, II Trimestre 2015. 13, 15, 16
Kotlikoff, L. J. and Raffelhu¨schen, B. (1999). Generational accounting around the
globe. The American Economic Review, 89(2):161–166. 10
Lee, R. D. and Carter, L. R. (1992). Modeling and forecasting us mortality. Journal
of the American statistical association, 87(419):659–671. 48, 51, 52
Moog, S., R. B., Reeker, G., et al. (2015). Ehrbare staaten? update 2015: Die nach-
haltigkeit der ffentlichen finanzen in europa. Argumente zur Marktwirtschaft
und Politik, (133). 35
MPLS (2014a). MPLS - Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali: la Comunita´
Albanese in Italia, rapporto annuale sulla presenza degli immigrati. . 14, 15,
16, 27
MPLS (2014b). MPLS - Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali: la Comu-
nita´ Cinese in Italia, rapporto annuale sulla presenza degli immigrati. . 14, 15,
27
MPLS (2014c). MPLS - Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali: La Comu-
nita´ Marocchina in Italia, rapporto annuale sulla presenza degli immigrati.
14, 15, 27
MPLS (2014d). MPLS - Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali: La Comu-
nita´ Ucraina in Italia, rapporto annuale sulla presenza degli immigrati. 14, 15,
27
107
MPLS (2014e). MPLS - Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali: Quinto
Rapporto Annuale, i migranti nel mercato del lavoro in Italia. 12, 13, 14, 15,
16, 27, 28
OECD (2014a). OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment: Mortality assumptions and longevity risk, implications for
pension funds and annuity providers. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/
9789264222748-en. 45, 48
OECD (2014b). OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development: Pensions outlook 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/
9789264222687-en. 2, 4, 5, 63, 65
OECD (2015). OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment: Pensions at a glance 2015, OECD and G20 indicators. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1787/pension_glance-2015-en. 1, 2, 4, 5, 17, 63
OECD (2016). OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment: Statistics on health status. hhttps://stats.oecd.org/. 2, 45
OECD and EU (2015). OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development and EU - European Union: Indicators of immigrant integration
2015. 13
Pitacco, E., Denuit, M., Haberman, S., and Olivieri, A. (2009). Modelling longevity
dynamics for pensions and annuity business. OUP Oxford. 46
Raffelhu¨schen, B. (1999). Generational accounting in europe. The American Eco-
nomic Review, 89(2):167–170. 10, 20, 23
Rizza, P. and Tommasino, P. (2010). Do we treat future generations fairly? ital-
ian fiscal policy through the prism of generational accounting. Giornale degli
Economisti e Annali di Economia, pages 115–153. 10
Rowthorn, R. (2008). The fiscal impact of immigration on the advanced
economies. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 24(3):560–580. 10
Samuelson, P. A. (1958). An exact consumption-loan model of interest with or
without the social contrivance of money. The journal of political economy, pages
467–482. 3, 64
Samuelson, P. A. (1975). Optimum social security in a life-cycle growth model.
International Economic Review, pages 539–544. 3, 64
Sinn, H.-W. (2000). Why a funded pension system is needed and why it is not
needed. International Tax and Public Finance, 7(4-5):389–410. 65
108
Sommacal, A. (2006). Pension systems and intragenenerational redistribution
when labor supply is endogenous. Oxford Economic Papers, 58(3):379–406. 67
Strozza, S. (2015). La presenza straniera in Italia. 16, 27
Wen, X., Pammolli, F., and Gnecco, G. (2015). Labor supply and capital accumu-
lation in an aging economy: when beveridge meets bismarck. 70
WHIP (2015). Work Histories Italian Panel, banca dati di storie lavorative
sviluppata grazie alla collaborazione tra Universita´ di Torino e l’Inps. http:
//www.laboratoriorevelli.it/whip. 48, 49, 50
World Bank (2005). Notional accounts: notional defined contribution plans as a
pension reform strategy. 4, 64, 65

Unless otherwise expressly stated, all original material of whatever
nature created by Benedetta Frassi and included in this thesis, is li-
censed under a Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial Share
Alike 2.5 Italy License.
Check creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/it/ for the legal
code of the full license.
Ask the author about other uses.
